Özel noted that one of the judges who released eight of İmamoğlu’s detained associates due to a lack of evidence was demoted for refusing to follow Erdoğan’s directives to order arrests despite the absence of supporting evidence.
Reiterated that Erdoğan sought Trump’s backing before the March 19 coup attempt and the arrest of Istanbul mayor Imamoglu, and claimed that Erdoğan dodges questions about whether he got Trump’s approval prior to İmamoğlu’s arrest
Unveiled the first plan for a rally outside Istanbul, set to take place this weekend in Samsun, a city of symbolic importance, as it was where Atatürk launched the Turkish War of Independence against the Allied powers in 1919.
He listed the boycotted companies and media outlets, directly calling out individual business leaders by name. He also announced that tomorrow they will visit the NTV (a major private TV channel) headquarters to protest the channel’s silence.
He called out Erdoğan for his silence on Trump’s remarks about turning Gaza into “seafront property” and the displacement of Palestinians, while reaffirming the CHP’s long-standing support for the Palestinian cause.
Ozel referred to Erdoğan-appointed ministers as mere “secretaries”, implying they’re nothing more than official stenographers for the regime without actual agency, and stated they would be treated accordingly.
Ozel argued that Erdoğan is incapable of solving the Kurdish issue—not just because he leads a junta regime, but because he stands against democracy itself, retaliating against Kurds for backing İmamoğlu and opposition candidates in Istanbul (referring to the 'urban consensus').
Openly accused Erdoğan of orchestrating the March 19 coup and labeled him a junta leader, stating that he is afraid of the ballot box. Earlier this week, Erdoğan reacted angrily to being called a junta leader and repeatedly denied the claims in speeches and on Twitter.
The Turkish opposition leader Ozgur Ozel gave a forceful speech at today’s Istanbul rally, significantly raising the stakes against Erdogan. There’s no sign of retreat and in fact, protests, political action, and calls for boycott are progressing steadily. Here are some notes🧵
Turkish politics analyst @yusufcan.bsky.social told me this extraordinary move was intended to demonstrate İmamoğlu's appeal across the country:
"It makes them look quite democratic in this in this context, plus it gives them a very strong legitimacy in the eyes of the people."
Protests erupted in #Turkey over the arrest of #Istanbul mayor & presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoglu. @wilsoncentermep.bsky.social Program Coordinator @yusufcan.bsky.social provides insight into the political landscape in Turkey and the country's next presidential election.
buff.ly/soZ0e12
I realized I stepped away from this platform for no good reason and ended up posting excessively on Twitter about the Turkish protests. It’s good to be back.
From Twitter censorship to millions of Turkish people protesting, so much has happened.
I’ll be discussing the tension in northern Syria following Assad’s fall and Erdoğan’s advances, the implications for the U.S., and potential paths to peace at a webinar hosted by the Kurdish Peace Institute and moderated by Meghan Bodette.
I agree. New arrangements in Syria could dramatically alter the political economy inside Turkey. There will be appetite to return refugees, and possibly send troops to AANES. The first may be popular but undermines aspects of RTE’s clientele, the second could prove more of a slog than anticipated.
Obviously, there are still 3.5 years until the next election, and much can change in that time. However, I find it hard to believe that AKP, behind the scenes, would view developments in Syria as a guaranteed path to electoral victory, given the domestic context—at least not in the short term.
I find it unlikely that Erdoğan would opt for an early election when he has until 2028 to govern. And, they seem to be prioritizing constitutional changes before holding any elections. Also, the economy is dire, making this a very different moment compared to the early election after Afrin in 2018.
I am not yet sure of the narrative that TR is the "winner" of the developments in Syria. It is too early to tell. Much depends on the dynamics among local actors (particularly the HTS and SDF), the dynamics between HTS and Ankara, and their social&political implications for internal politics in TR.
Erdogan’s political victories or “wins” often come at Turkey’s expense rather than its benefit. While online propaganda suggests otherwise, I doubt developments in Syria will serve the broader interests of Turkish society, especially if Turkey becomes further entangled in Syria’s domestic affairs.
📰 Sunday extras!
"What Syria’s Opposition Resurgence Means for Ankara" by @yusufcan.bsky.social.
I wrote about the opposition offensive in Syria and Ankara's approach to the evolving situation, exploring its potential implications for Turkish domestic politics, with comments from @gonultol.bsky.social, @stevenhyde.bsky.social and @omerozkizilcik.bsky.social
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what...
I wrote about the opposition offensive in Syria and Ankara's approach to the evolving situation, exploring its potential implications for Turkish domestic politics, with comments from @gonultol.bsky.social, @stevenhyde.bsky.social and @omerozkizilcik.bsky.social
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what...
Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu raised this issue at the 31st Türkiye Working Group Meeting of the European Committee of the Regions, yet discussions remain limited. While legal and illegal migration dominate the discourse, legitimate grievances continue to grow
Academics, students, and other professionals are increasingly impacted by visa rejections, with a concerning lack of transparency. Political factors may contribute, but addressing these issues openly and promptly to prevent further strain on EU-Turkey relations would be smart
A wave of “Schengen anxiety” is evident in the EU-Turkey relationship, with an increasing number of visa apps from Turkish citizens being denied. This calls for EU and Turkish authorities to provide clear explanations for the rejections and outline steps to address grievances.
Follow @wilsoncenter.org's Middle East Program on Bluesky!
9/ But all of this carries risks. Many within the Syrian opposition are Salafi Islamists who could pose a security threat to Turkey itself. Empowering such groups for short-term gains could backfire, destabilizing the region and Turkey in the long run.
8/ Erdoğan also leverages Syria and Syrians domestically. By framing his policies within a neo-Ottomanist discourse, he galvanizes his base while polarizing society. At the same time, he may pressure Kurds to support him through constitutional changes, securing his grip on power.
7/ Given the irredentist currents within Ankara, the Turkish government could potentially argue that Syria was never a “real” country, tho unlikely, using this narrative to justify expansionist military policies. But hard to imagine a scenario this going smoothly.
6/ In this scenario, Turkey could justify a direct intervention in Syria, arguing that “if we don’t act, the YPG will.” This approach would position Turkey as the primary actor shaping Syria’s future while sidelining rivals. Still, hard to achieve.
5/ Alternatively, Ankara may have a far more ambitious plan: expanding its borders/irredentism. Turkish media is full of this stuff. The groundwork for this could involve filling Syria’s power vacuum under the guise of countering HTS/FSA’s collapse or preventing a YPG takeover.
