Iran-based Baloch Sunni militant group Ansar al-Furqan have called on #Iranians to rise up against #Iran's leaders, saying "if you see the mujahideen in your vicinity, cooperate fully", providing contact details for further guidance
Mali has spent approx. $1bn on Russian mercenaries since their arrival in late 2021, according to this new investigation by @matteomaillard.bsky.social @jeuneafrique.com. That is reportedly more than the annual Malian defence budget
www.jeuneafrique.com/1766436/poli...
A JNIM supporter video claims to show the aftermath of a "coordinated attack with the separatists" in Kidal, targeting a convoy of #Malian army and #Russian #AfricaCorps
Evidence of coordination with Tuareg armed groups is rare, and JNIM does not admit such coordination
You can read some more key takeaways on my blog piece for @BBCMonitoring – link below – and the whole report by signing up for a free trial. Thanks for data collection and reporting contributions from Collins Nabiswa
monitoring.bbc.co.uk/inside-bbcm/...
ACLED data also shows that there were unusually high numbers of foreign kidnapping incidents in #Niger and #Mali last year
Despite representing a very small number of foreign kidnappings, international media focused on five high-profile cases in which the victims were US or European nationals - or where the reported ransom pay-out was considerable. The majority of these occurred in the #Sahel
Overall, the mining sector was worst impacted by kidnapping of foreigners (around 30%), followed by transport (13%), humanitarian/NGOs (8%), cement (7%), and energy (7%)
2025 saw a significant increase in the kidnapping of foreign nationals in Africa’s #Sahel region. Around 40% of high-profile cases across Africa were #Chinese, many working in #Mali's gold-rich regions. Some 15% were #Indian nationals mainly working in energy and cement
A photo circulating after last night's apparent attack on Niamey airport in #Niger shows a black and white flag featuring the Shahada - further indication of jihadist involvement. But still no claim from either #JNIM or #ISSahel
Local #Niger media is suggesting that "mortar fire" targeted Niamey's international airport last night, lending credibility to the idea that an armed group - possibly #JNIM - might have launched an attack. No official claim from any group, though
www.actuniger.com/societe/2172...
As communities continue to feel the awful repercussions of Bondi, governments will be asking themselves what they can do to keep people safer... A wider interpretation of extremism may help flag dangerous individuals in future. My piece for @newstatesman1913.bsky.social
tinyurl.com/332ec4fb
Similar to the New Orleans attack in January, IS has obliquely taken credit for inspiring the #bondiattack in #Sydney - but not for being operationally involved. Fits an emerging pattern of IS claims since summer last year in which IS blurs the line of what constitutes an IS attack
And ISEAP (Philippines/Indonesia) has not previously been known as a regional hub for operations abroad. A UNSC report from earlier this year estimated a 150-200 strong, highly factionalised, force
I shared some thoughts for BBC News on the trip made by the #bondibeach attack gunmen to the Philippines, allegedly for "military style training". IS operational capacity in the #Philippines has been low-level following a peak of activity around 2017-2019
Mali's Timbuktu region has been the focus of multiple pieces of #JNIM propaganda in recent weeks, where the group seems to be making extra efforts to win hearts and minds. This includes two statements condemning Africa Corps "executions" of civilians - a rarity since Wagner left in June
IS #Syria has officially claimed yesterday's attack in Aleppo which reportedly killed two Syrian govt customs officers. This comes on the heels of a rare attack - the first since 2018 - in Idlib province, traditionally a stronghold of HTS, and also rare #Islamicstate attacks in Homs and Hama
I spoke to @bellingcat.com about #JNIM's communication strategy in #Mali and how the group is articulating its ambitions at a critical point in the long-running jihadist insurgency
Great immersive investigative piece from Sebastian Vandermeersch, and insights from Héni Nsaibia
tinyurl.com/ys3exbh5
#JNIM claims killing 139+ people in its latest infographic poster rounding up attacks from November. Claimed fatalities fell from last month (187) but remain significantly higher than September (96) when resources began being poured into the #Mali fuel blockade
X's decision to display the geolocalisation of accounts has exposed dozens of prominent #Sahel pro-junta and pro-Russia influencers/trolls as based in the West, according to this article by LSI Africa. Many of them appear to be operating out of #France
www.lsi-africa.com/fr/actualite...
The latest #JNIM preaching photoset from #Mali shows unusually large crowds (seemingly around 100 in one photo), and almost a dozen individual locations
Most previous examples of such propaganda typically focused on one or two locations and showed smaller gatherings
JNIM have remained silent so far about these clashes, possibly because the group is so focused on attacks in south-western Mali, amidst a major blockade of #Bamako
The latest bout of clashes have mostly been in north-eastern #BurkinaFaso (Oudalan and Yagha provinces), near the border with Niger, with over 100 casualties claimed since mid September
Sept-Nov have seen a return of heavy clashes between #JNIM and #IS Sahel, according to IS claims. Clashes on this scale have been unprecedented since late 2022, during territory disputes in eastern #Mali's Menaka region in the context of French troop withdrawal
The cancellation affects one of #Mali's most important annual religious gatherings that has been taking place since 1966.
The Catholic Bishops of Mali have cancelled a pilgrimage to the Marian shrine of Kita in the western Kayes Region (scheduled for 29-30 November), citing the fuel crisis caused by #JNIM's blockade, according to Malijet
malijet.com/a_la_une_du_...
Local Malian daily newspaper Le Soir de Bamako reports on the public execution of prominent TikToker by suspected jihadists. Shocking news like this couldn't come at a worse time for #Bamako, where tensions are already high after more than two months of #JNIM's blockade in southern #Mali
UAE's overall imports of gold are down around 18%, meaning that the overall share of questionable/conflict-linked gold is even higher
A few days later the 2024 UAE import data was mysteriously removed from the UN Comtrade platform... I am still waiting on UAE's MoFA for comment
- Burkina Faso: 162%
- Uganda (hub for gold from DRC): 120%
- Armenia (hub for Russian gold): 92%
- Sudan: 70%
- Egypt (transit point for Sudanese gold): 69%
- Russia: 63%
- Rwanda (hub for gold from DRC): 38%
- Mali: 9.7%
On 31 October, UN Comtrade finally published 2024 gold import data from the UAE. The data showed undeniable increases in imports of gold linked to conflict, and known smuggling hubs of conflict (or "blood") gold. They are highlighted green, namely... (cont. below)
"It is the police who create chaos. They come with dozens of cans, and afterwards, we find them selling the fuel," according to one tax driver.
Meanwhile, two days ago Malian authorities reportedly arrested at least 30 people accused of involvement in a petroleum theft network in Bamako
