Investigators themselves requested the softer measure — and the reasons remain classified. Either Tsalikov promised cooperation, or the order from above came with instructions not to push too hard.
\end
Such coordination among siloviki is unusual, especially given that Tsalikov was charged not only with corruption but also with organising a criminal group, a charge that can carry up to 20 years. Yet, the court placed him under house arrest not in pre-trial detention.
6/
And the juciest part. To bring this case together siloviki combined materials from three agencies: Interior Ministry — testimony from contractors in the Voentorg chain; Investigative Committee — bribery schemes via commercial real estate; FSB — evidence of cash and assets
5/
Tsalikov’s charges are not about the fake body armor case after all. Instead, investigators accuse him over procurement at the military retailer Voentorg — with alleged damages of 6 bn rubles, even larger than the case against Ivanov.
4/
Another detail: investigators recently questioned all previously detained MoD officials — including Ivanov. But none of Shoigu’s former deputies provided testimony against Tsalikov. So the core of Shoigu’s network is still largely holding the line.
3/
www.kommersant.ru/doc/8481219
Tsalikov was detained inside the investigator’s office, after being summoned for questioning. Just days earlier he reportedly appeared calm and unconcerned. He likely believed that testifying earlier against ex–deputy minister Timur Ivanov had shielded him.
2/
UPD on Tsalikov case over the last 36 hours.
Detaining Shoigu’s longtime No.2 required a rare symphony of 3 security agencies working together — usually a sign the move was cleared at the very top. And yet all this only resulted in his house arrest.
1/
www.kommersant.ru/doc/8496117
As a result of these waves, former Shoigu deputies — now including Tsalikov — are effectively being stockpiled inside the same legal machinery.
It’s hard to see why they would all be kept in play like this — unless the Kremlin is preparing the moment to scapegoat Shoigu himself.
Key defendants in the MoD cases — Ivanov, Popov and others — refuse to cooperate with investigators. Instead, siloviki keep piling on charges, building “criminal community” cases and seizing their assets, while refusing to leave them to the war
7/
www.kommersant.ru/doc/8480955
In Jan 2025 Tsalikov testified against Ivanov, seemingly hoping the pressure for himself had passed. But other MoD procurement cases kept expanding. A contractor for the fake body-armor struck a deal with siloviki — and gave testimony against Tsalikov
6/
istories.media/news/2026/0...
Tsalikov’s own trajectory reflected this patern. After initial Timur Ivanov’s arrest in 2024, Tsalikov was removed from MoD and tried to protect himself becoming a senator with the stop as elected regional MP in Tuva. The Kremlin blocked the plan
5/
The crackdown around the MoD has followed a clear and classical wave logic. Siloviki dismantle connected rent chains step by step: first officials, then direct contractors, their subcontractors and finally oversighters. Each wave generates testimony and documents that enable the next one.
4/
By 2025 the process had escalated into a broader dismantling of the entire Shoigu's clan, reaching structures not directly tied to MoD. More than 70 people have now been affected — the trajectory I outlined earlier in another text for Carnegie Politika
3/
carnegieendowment.org/ru/russia-e...
Initially, in early 2024, purges in MoD looked like what I described for Carnegie Politika as “rotation through repression” — a familiar and quite often used mechanism where the Kremlin removes one elite group from a key asset and replaces it with another.
2/
carnegieendowment.org/russia-eura...
Today Russian siloviki detained Ruslan Tsalikov, Sergei Shoigu’s longtime №2 across all his previous positions: Min. of Emergencies, Moscow reg, MoD. Given how MoD purges have unfolded, it looks like the penultimate stop in the chain. The next step can be Shoigu himself
www.kommersant.ru/doc/8480988
This shows that the Kremlin no longer needs more nuanced co-optation strategies for the urban class. The regime is standardising Moscow with the rest of the country. The authoritarian toolkit is shrinking and simplifing — alongside the urban middle class it once tried to manage.
Only this week, key remaining civic nodes were dismantled. “Open Space,” one of the last offline hubs for activists, closed after being labelled a “foreign agent.” Memorial was declared “undesirable.” Now the Gulag Museum is being ideologically repurposed.
7/
novayagazeta.ru/articles/20...
During 2023-2026, the remnants of Moscow's previous heritage of “liberal willingness” often previously supported by Mayor's officials or close to Putin oligarchs as Roman Abramovich are being systematically destroyed.
6/
That equilibrium began erode right after the start of the invasion. In may 2023 the criminal case against theatre director Berkovich shoked the cultural community. Later this year “naked party” scandal reinforced the message that even apolitical cultural space had narrowed.
5/
The logic was rational rather than liberal. By allowing multiple semi-autonomous cultural and civic platforms, the authorities diffused frustration among the urban middle class, redirecting overt political opposition into symbolic, historical or artistic discussion.
4/
This period is often associated with the so-called “Kapkov era” when cultural institutions, public lectures, parks and museums became venues where active urban audiences could engage in critical reflection — albeit in reframed, non-confrontational forms
3/
novayagazeta.eu/articles/20...
For much of the 2010s, Moscow occupied a special position within Russia’s increasingly conservative political order. While overt political protest was opressed after 2012, space for indirect expression — via culture, history, and civic projects — remained comparatively wider
2/
Today Moscow has announced the restructuring of the Gulag Museum into a “museum of the victims of genocide among Soviet people”, now headed by a war veteran. It perfectly illustrates the last years developments in the Kremlin toolkit for managing urban dissent.
1/
www.mos.ru/news/item/1...
Politico published a story with my contribution on the power transfer in Chechnya if Kadyrov were to die. The timing is telling: amid fresh news about the car crash with Kadyrov's son, whom he is grooming as his heir in opposite to Kremlin's candidate.
www.politico.eu/article/ram...
8/ Together, these dynamics reshape the edges - not the centre - of the EP. The pro-Kremlin bloc is bigger, louder, and more ideologically diverse. But it remains fragmented and isolated, able to signal Moscow’s narratives — yet still far from being able to shape EU policy.
7/ My personal “favourite” example in SMER is Ľuboš Blaha — the most emblematic case. His long-standing alignment with Moscow isn't symbolic: he travelled to Ru, spoke at MGIMO, met with the head of the SVR, and built a full political persona around anti-Western narratives.
6/ But the most dramatic transformation comes from Robert Fico’s SMER.
Its enlarged group now ranks among the most reliably pro-Russian actors in the entire EP — a sharp contrast with its more ambiguous positioning in earlier years.
5/ Even stronger shift is visible in AfD. The delegation is larger, and with the new far-right blocs providing ideological cover, AfD’s voting record becomes deeper red.
4/ RN’s voting pattern tells the story. In 2022–2024, the party often softened its stance — abstaining or splitting its vote on key resolutions.
But after the 2024 election, RN returned to a more assertive line, voting against Ukraine-support measures
3/ The emergence of two new far-right groups in this Parliament has clearly shifted the dynamics. With stronger allies and greater parliamentary weight, traditional Kremlin-leaning parties have become noticeably bolder in how they vote on Russia- and Ukraine-related resolutions.
