Things undergrads are surprised to learn -- there are only modest amounts spent on American politics.
data from @opensecrets.org and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Trump's first year in office saw a rapid decline in GOP affiliation, erasing the advantage in net partisanship that had endured during the Biden term.
data from @gallup.com
Views of American industrial sectors remain strikingly non-ideological (save for the publishing, the movie industry, and fossil fuels).
The consequences of low media trust and Republican partisanship--only 1 news media source enjoys over 30% use among those partisans.
Data from @pewresearch.org's American Trends Panel, March 2025.
Among the most vivid declines in the American people's trust -- their diminished trust in other people.
Data from @gallup.com's Social Series.
The shrinking levels of white ethnocentrism in the
@electionstudies.bsky.social Cumulative Datafile conceal a pretty striking partisan effect: since around 2012 very low ethnocentrism among white Democrats, but the opposite effect among other Democrats.
With thanks to amengel.bsky.social, the decline is far more modest when I take proper account for the administrative codes in the feeling thermometers
hey Drew -- I'll email you my code and you can see if I'm straight
Americans have become increasingly confident that their votes are counted as intended—aside from a sharp drop among Republicans in 2020.
Data from the Survey of the Performance of American Elections.
When 'When Prophecy Fails' Fails:
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
(h/t @ethanvporter.bsky.social )
Line charts showing Americans’ confidence in 14 national institutions (1973–2025), split by party (Democrats in blue, Independents in gray, Republicans in red). Institutions include the military, small business, churches, police, Supreme Court, banks, medical system, public schools, newspapers, organized labor, big business, criminal justice system, Congress, and health maintenance organizations. Across institutions, partisan polarization has grown, especially for public schools and the Supreme Court. By 2025, banks and big business are among the few institutions with similar moderate/high confidence across parties.
In 2025, polarization on schools & the Supreme Court leaves only Banks + Big Business with moderate/high confidence across parties.
Populism still cuts across partisan lines. Data: @gallup.com Social Series.
The recent reversal in Republicans' moral approval of Gay and Lesbian relations is even more striking in context -- it does *not* coincide with more restrictive moral licensing in other areas.
Data from Gallup's Social Series.
The inversion between income and Whites' presidential vote is also found among the validated voters in the just released Cooperative Election Study.
Something undergrads after often surprised to find out--there's curiously little money in American politics.
Nope! Survey research was expensive in the 1940s!
The last time I posted the income relationship to presidential vote among White respondents to the @electionstudies.bsky.social ANES, people asked for additional estimates among all voters.
Updated estimates here:
Rapid secularization of Democratic politics continues -- in the 2024 ANES, only 54% of Democrats reported religion an important part of their life.
Trump's presidency has coincided with a rapid decline in GOP partisan advantage -- a 5 percentage point decline since the end of Biden's presidency.
Data from Gallup social series.
Might be of interest to those teaching American politics -- motivated reasoning in retrospective economic/personal/geostrategic evaluation has been a stable part of presidential elections for 40 years.
Data from the @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024 timeseries.
By the end of 2024, Stimson's Policy Mood was near 20 year highs in liberal policy support.
(Ht @mattgrossmann.bsky.social for tweeting the new data!)
As expected, the change in government sharply reduced Democrats’ trust in the CDC and FDA. But surprisingly, by 2025 Democrats now express higher trust in federal health authorities than Republicans do.
With initial data, it appears that Trump's 2nd term approval is weakly related to consumer confidence.
The rightward shift in young men's partisanship is recent -- since 2024.
data from the @pewresearch.org 's NPORS study.
Even Republicans have not recovered their pre-pandemic levels of economic confidence.
Data from the University of Michigan ISR's (bsky-less?) consumer sentiment survey
Presidential vote has only been correlated with life expectancy since 2008, and even then the effect is strongest among whites.
While liberals have moved almost a full scale point more supportive of free trade since the election (on a 7pt scale) conservatives are unmoved.
A super interesting case for the role of elites in shaping mass attitudes.
Data from the incredible @prl.bsky.social 's 'America's Political Pulse.'
Outside of a tiny number of super polarized issues (in this case, immigration and climate change), the American public basically agrees on the topics deserving of national attention.
Data from AP-NORC.
Gun control attitudes continue to depolarize (on the margins!) in the 2024 General Social Survey.
Data from @norc.org
It's only on questions of race where younger generations are less tolerant -- for the other speakers on the GSS, Gen Z/Millenials basically indistinguishable from other Americans.
National political spending preferences by partisanship, 1972-2024.
Fascinating that numerous policy areas have seen negligble polarization over this period. Data from @norc.org's GSS
