SERRC

Intellectual Vices: Perhaps More is More? A Reply to Matheson, Francesca Pongiglione Abstract Jonathan Matheson’s critique (2025) of my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025) hinges on the claim that the vice I describe is not novel, but rather a variation of familiar epistemic vices—namely, intellectual arrogance and hyper-autonomy. In what follows, I will explain in more detail why I chose to posit a new epistemic vice rather than rely on existing categories to explain the phenomenon of…

Intellectual Vices: Perhaps More is More? A Reply to Matheson, Francesca Pongiglione

Abstract Jonathan Matheson’s critique (2025) of my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025) hinges on the claim that the vice I describe is not novel, but rather a variation of familiar epistemic vices—namely, intellectual…

No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit Machines: A Reply to Hauswald, Moti Mizrahi Abstract In Mizrahi (2025a), I sketch two arguments against the claim that LLMs should be granted the status of epistemic authorities worthy of epistemic respect. Rico Hauswald (2026) objects to the second premise (2, II) of each of these arguments and asks, “Why shouldn’t there be reliable bullshit machines?” In this paper, I respond to his objections and answer his question.

No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit Machines: A Reply to Hauswald, Moti Mizrahi

Abstract In Mizrahi (2025a), I sketch two arguments against the claim that LLMs should be granted the status of epistemic authorities worthy of epistemic respect. Rico Hauswald (2026) objects to the second premise (2,…

Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius, Francesca Pongiglione In commenting on my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025), David Lanius (2025) makes several interesting observations, all of which point to the need for a deeper exploration and clearer definition of this epistemic disposition. The objective of these observations is manifold: to distinguish hubris from other similar but distinct vices; to avoid confusing it with a totally legitimate, and valuable, epistemic practice—namely, thinking critically; and finally, to more carefully assess the social risks raised by it.

Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius, Francesca Pongiglione

In commenting on my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025), David Lanius (2025) makes several interesting observations, all of which point to the need for a deeper exploration and clearer definition of this epistemic…

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable ‘Bullshit Machines’? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 1–7. ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2026. “Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 8–10.

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026

Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable ‘Bullshit Machines’? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 1–7. ❧ McCraw,…

Why Epistemic Criteria Are Not Primary and Not Enough: A Response to Holst’s Epistemic Approach to Democratising Expertise, Hannah Hilligardt Within the values in science debate, it is a popular position to allow for social values and aims to shape scientific research as long as they do not conflict with epistemic values and aims. In her recent paper, Cathrine Holst applies a similar argument to debates on the democratisation of scientific institutions. She proposes that while democratisation is in principle desirable, epistemic considerations should have priority over whatever other reasons we might have to implement democratisation measures in scientific institutions.

Why Epistemic Criteria Are Not Primary and Not Enough: A Response to Holst’s Epistemic Approach to Democratising Expertise, Hannah Hilligardt

Within the values in science debate, it is a popular position to allow for social values and aims to shape scientific research as long as they do not…

Radical Universalism: A Review, Mark D. West The Enlightenment’s universalist wager now faces coordinated assault from positions that ostensibly oppose one another. On the right, nationalism and civilizational particularism treat universality as a naïve fiction or, worse, as a solvent of the loyalties that make political life possible; the relevant unit of moral concern is not the human being as such but the compatriot, the co-religionist, the member of “our” people.

Radical Universalism: A Review, Mark D. West

The Enlightenment’s universalist wager now faces coordinated assault from positions that ostensibly oppose one another. On the right, nationalism and civilizational particularism treat universality as a naïve fiction or, worse, as a solvent of the…

Maintenance, Repair, and the Nature of Artifacts: Comments on Lawler and Vega-Encabo, Tim Juvshik Two recent trends have emerged in two separate subfields of philosophy which have increased our understanding of the nature of artifacts—things like cellphones, chairs, and hammers. First, analytic metaphysics has increasingly recognized that artifacts are distinctly social entities (e.g. Thomasson 2014; Pearce 2016). Second, philosophy of technology has recently come to recognize the importance of maintenance and repair practices for our understanding of the nature of technical artifacts and the built world, more generally (e.g.

Maintenance, Repair, and the Nature of Artifacts: Comments on Lawler and Vega-Encabo, Tim Juvshik

Two recent trends have emerged in two separate subfields of philosophy which have increased our understanding of the nature of artifacts—things like cellphones, chairs, and hammers. First, analytic…

Dialectical Neglect, Principles, and Pragmatic Deep Disagreement Optimism: A Second Reply to Serebrinsky, Scott F. Aikin and Alison Emery Abstract In “Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect,” Dalila Serebrinsky defends her development of the principles approach to deep disagreements, noting that with the notion of ‘derived’ principles, not only can the principles approach accommodate the phenomenon of gradable depth of disagreement, the principles approach can mitigate the worries of what we had called ‘dialectical neglect’ between deeply disagreeing parties. We, here, reopen the critical discussion along three lines.

Dialectical Neglect, Principles, and Pragmatic Deep Disagreement Optimism: A Second Reply to Serebrinsky, Scott F. Aikin and Alison Emery

Abstract In “Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect,” Dalila Serebrinsky defends her development of the principles approach to deep disagreements, noting…

Knowledge Management Against Scientific Autonomy? An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang This interview engages with Steve Fuller’s analysis of knowledge management (KM), focusing on its implications for scientific autonomy, epistemic values, and the governance of innovation under contemporary capitalism. Rather than approaching knowledge management as a neutral set of organizational techniques, the discussion treats KM as a historically situated project that actively redefines what counts as valuable knowledge, legitimate innovation, and responsible scientific progress.

Knowledge Management Against Scientific Autonomy? An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang

This interview engages with Steve Fuller’s analysis of knowledge management (KM), focusing on its implications for scientific autonomy, epistemic values, and the governance of innovation under contemporary…

How to Respond to Generalism about Contrarian Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Duetz, Kurtis Hagen Arguably the most contested area in the epistemology of conspiracy theories is the epistemic status of conspiracy theories that conflict with an “official account” (variously defined). In a recent article, J.C.M. Duetz purports to argue that “we ought to be particularists, not only in the face of conspiracy, but in the face of official explanations too” (2025, 1 and 3). That is, we ought to judge official explanations on their own particular merits, rather than just accepting them uncritically on the basis of their official status (and whatever is thought to ground that status).

How to Respond to Generalism about Contrarian Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Duetz, Kurtis Hagen

Arguably the most contested area in the epistemology of conspiracy theories is the epistemic status of conspiracy theories that conflict with an “official account” (variously defined). In a recent…

Structure, Culture, and Norms: A Further Dialogue with Mangraviti, Colin R. Caret In “The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret” (2025), Franci Mangraviti takes me to task (Caret 2025) for underplaying logic’s contribution to epistemic injustice. My skepticism is said to be “stuck between underselling the role of logic education in making a difference, and misrepresenting contemporary logic culture”. In this note, I continue our discussion of these issues with a focus on explanation and mediation.

Structure, Culture, and Norms: A Further Dialogue with Mangraviti, Colin R. Caret

In “The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret” (2025), Franci Mangraviti takes me to task (Caret 2025) for underplaying logic’s contribution to epistemic injustice. My skepticism is said to be “stuck between…

If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t: On Feminist Epistemology and a Historical Myth, Part II, Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick Section 4: … And Its Philosophical Uptake According to Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna (2018), it is: [N]ow accepted that the peak in sexual activity during ovulation is explained by female rhesus monkeys initiating sex, but for a long time the research carried out overlooked this fact and instead focused on the behaviours and capacities of the male monkeys. / Kim Wallen […] says that the crucial turning point was in 1976—over 30 years after examples of female initiation were first recorded—when one of the “patriarchs” who had “dominated” the field published a paper distinguishing proceptivity (the active solicitation of sexual activity) from the more passive receptivity.

If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t: On Feminist Epistemology and a Historical Myth, Part II, Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick

Section 4: … And Its Philosophical Uptake According to Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna (2018), it is: [N]ow accepted that the peak in sexual activity during…

If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t: On Feminist Epistemology and a Historical Myth, Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick

According to an account popularized by Kim Wallen (and, more importantly, according to the appropriation of this story by feminist epistemologists), it was only since 1976…

On Reasonable Cooperation and Vaccine Hesitancy Among Ethnically Marginalized Communities: A Reply to Kelsall and Sorell, Tarun Kattumana In “Two Kinds of Vaccine Hesitancy”, Joshua Kelsall and Tom Sorell (2025) consider whether it is reasonable to be vaccine hesitant. The paper discusses a number of key issues such as: (i) open questions about representativeness in vaccine trials; (ii) novel vaccines using the mRNA vaccine platform; (iii) questions raised by new variants of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (iv) distrust of institutions offering vaccines on account of discriminatory practices.

On Reasonable Cooperation and Vaccine Hesitancy Among Ethnically Marginalized Communities: A Reply to Kelsall and Sorell, Tarun Kattumana

In “Two Kinds of Vaccine Hesitancy”, Joshua Kelsall and Tom Sorell (2025) consider whether it is reasonable to be vaccine hesitant. The paper discusses a number…

Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann, Benjamin W. McCraw I want to extend an additional and deeper thanks to Peter Baumann for the continued dialogue stemming from my paper. Baumann’s charitable, yet critical, continued discussion models what is best in the philosophical tradition. I hope my few thoughts in response can help continue it further. I will quickly mention and address a few points that strike me from Baumann’s response.

Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann, Benjamin W. McCraw

I want to extend an additional and deeper thanks to Peter Baumann for the continued dialogue stemming from my paper. Baumann’s charitable, yet critical, continued discussion models what is best in the…

Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable “Bullshit Machines”? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities, Rico Hauswald In a recent contribution to SERRC, Moti Mizrahi criticizes current attempts to make conceptual space for the idea of artificial epistemic authorities (AEAs), that is, large language models (LLMs) or other AI systems functioning as epistemic authorities (Mizrahi 2025). In particular, he takes issue with a recent article of mine (Hauswald 2025), in which I assess the arguments both for and against allowing the possibility of granting AI systems the status of AEAs.

Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable “Bullshit Machines”? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities, Rico Hauswald

In a recent contribution to SERRC, Moti Mizrahi criticizes current attempts to make conceptual space for the idea of artificial epistemic authorities (AEAs), that is, large…

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 12, 1–80, January 2026 Volume 15, Issue 1, 1–80, January 2026 ❧ Kukkonen, Karin. 2026. “A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to ‘Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 1–6. ❧ Shajahan, Muhammed Shah. 2026. “Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 7–14.

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 12, 1–80, January 2026

Volume 15, Issue 1, 1–80, January 2026 ❧ Kukkonen, Karin. 2026. “A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to ‘Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (1): 1–6. ❧ Shajahan, Muhammed Shah.…

Measures of Epistemic Autonomy: Remarks on Beebe’s Scales, Heather Battaly James Beebe’s “The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy without Intellectual Humility” (2024) asks whether intellectual humility can prevent epistemic autonomy from becoming an extreme form of intellectual individualism. More specifically, Beebe is interested in whether intellectual humility moderates the predicted pitfalls of excessive epistemic autonomy, which include increased susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs and decreased trust in scientists. Using a series of three studies, his paper aims to test whether people who are epistemically autonomous, but not intellectually humble, are more likely to believe conspiracy theories and less likely to trust scientists than people who are both epistemically autonomous and intellectually humble.

Measures of Epistemic Autonomy: Remarks on Beebe’s Scales, Heather Battaly

James Beebe’s “The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy without Intellectual Humility” (2024) asks whether intellectual humility can prevent epistemic autonomy from becoming an extreme form of intellectual individualism. More…

Death as an Epistemological Foundation, Ilina Marinova Debates over brain death and organ donation are often framed as technical or ethical disputes. This article argues that something more fundamental is at stake. It examines death as a functional epistemic category that modern societies rely on to close accounts, order events in time, and terminate responsibility across institutions and individuals. By distinguishing between death as a boundary sufficient for learning and judgment, and death as a discrete, time-indexed zero-point required for large-scale coordination and planning, the article shows why contemporary controversies persist despite decades of definitional refinement.

Death as an Epistemological Foundation, Ilina Marinova

Debates over brain death and organ donation are often framed as technical or ethical disputes. This article argues that something more fundamental is at stake. It examines death as a functional epistemic category that modern societies rely on…

Gnostic Populism or What I Learned on X, Bernard N. Wills One of the most striking things about our contemporary culture (and its assumed ‘secularity) is the degree to which it recapitulates mythic and theological patterns long assumed lost and superseded.  This is especially true in the political realm where rival mythologies clash in the form of secular ideologies. One of these myths is the myth of universal emancipation. With Badiou we may credit St.

Gnostic Populism or What I Learned on X, Bernard N. Wills

One of the most striking things about our contemporary culture (and its assumed ‘secularity) is the degree to which it recapitulates mythic and theological patterns long assumed lost and superseded.  This is especially true in the political…

A “Parasitology” of Interdisciplinary Collaborations: Theorizing the Add-on Role of Social Sciences and Humanities, Judith Igelsböck Abstract Anita Välikangas’s analysis of a broad selection of interdisciplinary funding programs shows that the Social Sciences and Humanities’ (SSH) relegation to subordinate “add-on” roles with limited opportunities for epistemically oriented research in interdisciplinary projects, is already prefigured by funding structures. Beyond holding significant implications for research policy, this finding necessitates a critical reflection on the positionality of the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) within STEM-dominated interdisciplinary collaborations.

A “Parasitology” of Interdisciplinary Collaborations: Theorizing the Add-on Role of Social Sciences and Humanities, Judith Igelsböck

Abstract Anita Välikangas’s analysis of a broad selection of interdisciplinary funding programs shows that the Social Sciences and Humanities’ (SSH) relegation to…

Understanding, Teaching, and Phenomenology in the Age of LLMs: Critical Reply to Malfatti’s “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding”, Jacob Rump In “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding” (2025), Federica Isabella Malfatti provides a thought-provoking account of what it would take for an Large Language Model (LLM) such as ChatGPT to count as a good teacher, insofar as teachers are fosterers of understanding, not just knowledge.[1] The essay is a welcome extension of the current focus on understanding in epistemology to technology contexts, and especially timely given the current concerning state of AI use in education.

Understanding, Teaching, and Phenomenology in the Age of LLMs: Critical Reply to Malfatti’s “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding”, Jacob Rump

In “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding” (2025), Federica Isabella Malfatti provides a thought-provoking account of what it would take for an Large…

What Are We to Do About Vicious Distrusters? A Reply to Carter and Meehan, Johnny Brennan The pursuit of knowledge can go wrong in many ways. It can go wrong when trying to gain knowledge through reasoning. We jump to conclusions, ignore disconfirming evidence, improperly interpret evidence, assume the very thing we are trying to prove, favor what is salient or most recent in our memory rather than what is representative. Call these errors of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge can also go wrong when trying to identify who the trustworthy testifiers are who can impart knowledge to us.

What Are We to Do About Vicious Distrusters? A Reply to Carter and Meehan, Johnny Brennan

The pursuit of knowledge can go wrong in many ways. It can go wrong when trying to gain knowledge through reasoning. We jump to conclusions, ignore disconfirming evidence, improperly interpret evidence,…

Interstitial Justice and Erasure: A Response to Richardson, Ásta A lot of philosophical work in the last two decades has been at the intersection of theoretical and practical philosophy, especially concerning social aspects of epistemic, linguistic, or ontological phenomena. Although the literature on epistemic and discursive injustice is now quite extensive, it is only recently that philosophers have started to theorize forms of injustice that can be called “metaphysical”. These include phenomena such as ontic injustice (Jenkins 2023), ontic oppression (Dembroff 2018; 2020), ontic exclusion and erasure (Richardson 2023), and categorical and interstitial injustice (Ásta 2019; 2024).

Interstitial Justice and Erasure: A Response to Richardson, Ásta

A lot of philosophical work in the last two decades has been at the intersection of theoretical and practical philosophy, especially concerning social aspects of epistemic, linguistic, or ontological phenomena. Although the…

Restricting AI to Its Proper Sphere: A Response to Blok, Jonas Hallström In his fine and philosophically well-argued article “Economics and Politics in the Age of AI” (2025), Vincent Blok asserts that the “technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life” and subsequently that specifically artificial intelligence (AI) leads to “instrumentalization, commodification and datafication of all domains of human life” (1–2). In Blok’s view, it is the notion of an…

Restricting AI to Its Proper Sphere: A Response to Blok, Jonas Hallström

In his fine and philosophically well-argued article “Economics and Politics in the Age of AI” (2025), Vincent Blok asserts that the “technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the…

Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home, Muhammed Shah Shajahan Muhammed Nishad’s reflections on Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (wohnen) to interpret the social and political significance of Mosques in the South Indian region of Malabar open an occasion to think about existence and tradition more broadly and in an interconnected manner.[1] As I am neither an expert on Heidegger, nor do I claim a ground in the political and philosophical stakes of engaging him,

Thinking Dwelling with Heidegger and Asad: Existence, Authority, and the Problem of Home, Muhammed Shah Shajahan

Muhammed Nishad’s reflections on Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (wohnen) to interpret the social and political significance of Mosques in the South Indian region of Malabar open…

A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to “Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, Karin Kukkonen, My proposal in the initial article (2024) was that literary texts and the expertise of literary scholars have an important role to play in developing new means for exchange and dialogue across disciplines. Put into practice in the salon format, the literary texts that all participants have read support the discussion by providing epistemic common ground and by maintaining the flexibility of a “boundary object” that allows for multiple interpretations, while the expertise of literary scholars in picking up on formal features of the literary texts themselves, serves to structure the metacognitive dimension of the discussion.

A Response to Caracciolo’s Reply to “Designing an Expert Setting for Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, Karin Kukkonen,

My proposal in the initial article (2024) was that literary texts and the expertise of literary scholars have an important role to play in developing new means for exchange and…

SERRC: Of Note, 2025 My sincerest thanks to the SERRC’s contributors in 2025. Your work cultivated the reception of select articles published in Social Epistemology and Techné and produced insights about ongoing dialogues and projects. I am particularly grateful for the continuing engagement of all our contributors and our readers. … . Highlighted Resources: ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2024. ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2023…

SERRC: Of Note, 2025

My sincerest thanks to the SERRC’s contributors in 2025. Your work cultivated the reception of select articles published in Social Epistemology and Techné and produced insights about ongoing dialogues and projects. I am particularly grateful for the continuing engagement of…

SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 ❧ Basham, Lee. 2025. “Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 1–10. ❧ Tuckwell, William. 2025. “A Comment on Anderson’s ‘Virtuous Virtue Signaling, Morally Good Grandstanding’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 11–15. ❧ Yang, Yang. 2025. “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism in the Context of AI and Knowledge Governance in China and the West: An Interview with Steve Fuller.”

SERRC: Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025

Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 ❧ Basham, Lee. 2025. “Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 1–10. ❧ Tuckwell, William. 2025. “A Comment on Anderson’s ‘Virtuous…

Epistemic Agency Is Enhancing Your Power to Know: A Reply to Coeckelbergh, Gärtner, Steup and Xu, Adam Riggio

A massively important concern for our time, at the moment, is the question of epistemic agency, how we can develop it, and how we can protect it from pernicious forces and influences that…