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Law professors blogging since 2002 -- independent until 2014, hosted at Washington Post 2014-17, hosted at Reason 2017-now

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[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread Auto-post somehow failed today, so I've manually posted this. Enjoy as usual!
09.03.2026 15:35 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Alleged Threats Against Alleged Groomers / Sex Traffickers of Minors Don't Justify Sealing of Personal Information / Pseudonymity First, the backstory from Courthouse News Service [Monique Merrill] about an earlier decision in the case denying the defendants' motion to dismiss: A YouTuber must face claims that he groomed and assaulted two underage fans, a federal judge ruled on Wednesday. James Jackson, known online by the name "Onision," and his spouse Lucas Jackson, known online as "Laineybot" or "Kai," did not convince a federal judge to dismiss claims brought by former fans who accused the couple of violating sex trafficking and minor abuse laws by enticing them across state lines and coercing them into commercial sex acts. Regina Alonso and a plaintiff identified under the pseudonym Sarah sued the YouTubers in 2023, accusing the two of using their YouTube page to solicit explicit photos from them while they were underage and sexually assaulting Sarah while she was a minor. Now, Friday's decision in Alonso v. Jackson by Judge John Chun (W.D. Wash.) about the sealing / pseudonymity questions: Plaintiffs bring various claims against Defendants James and Lucas Jackson relating to alleged grooming and sex trafficking when Plaintiffs were minors. Defendants move for an order … redacting and sealing "all past and future personal identifying information (PII)" appearing on the docket and accessible via PACER, including their home address, phone number, email addresses, last names, and household details" … [and] permitting them to proceed pseudonymously by using only their first names …. Defendants say that good cause exists to seal their PII because they have suffered a "relentless campaign of doxing, vandalism," violent threats, and stalkers. They submit about 55 exhibits purporting to document this harassment. Most of these exhibits show online harassment, though Exhibit 2 shows images that Defendants say show vandalism of their residence in 2020. Defendants also say that an online individual known as "Anonymous Gene" or "Gene" [not me! -EV] has engaged in a campaign of intense, long-running harassment, posting photos of Defendants' home and revealing its address multiple times. Defendants contend that this harassment "was consistently executed in direct connection with the efforts of [Plaintiff's counsel] and her clients," and that "Anonymous Gene" "claims to be funding [Plaintiff's counsel]" and is "directly cooperating with the allegedly well-funded plaintiff Sarah." … Defendants' first request redacting and sealing of "all past and future personal identifying information (PII)" appearing on the docket and accessible via PACER, including their home address, phone number, email addresses, last names, and household details." … It is unclear if this means that the entire docket be sealed and then new copies of the documents filed, or if the Court would have to individually replace docket entries with public redacted and sealed unredacted filings…. [W]hile there is "a strong presumption in favor of access to court records," the right is not absolute…. Cases permitting redaction of the type that Defendants seek here appear to arrive at diverging conclusions. For example, one court in this Circuit permitted redaction of "home and personal email addresses" of a nonparty because this information was "irrelevant to the merits of" that action. See NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (D. Nev. 2015). But another court denied a request to redact the plaintiff's residential address absent legal authority requiring it. See Eng v. Hawaii (D. Haw. 2021). In other instances, courts have granted retroactive redaction of addresses when the litigant is enrolled in some program with address confidentiality, which is not present here. The Court finds that Defendants have not shown good cause to retroactively seal and redact PII from the docket or the exhibits filed in support of the motion. First, Defendants cite no case in which a court approved the retroactive sealing and redaction of the type of information at issue. Defendants' request concerns 263 docket entries amounting to hundreds of pages, which would pose significant logistical challenges. Second, most of the evidence of online harassment predates Plaintiffs' original complaints, which were filed in 2023. Because this evidence is from several years ago, it does not show that "specific harm will result" if the docket of this case is not retroactively sealed and redacted. Nor does it show that otherwise harm will result. It is also unclear to the Court that any exhibits reveal PII. Third, the only evidence of harassment since the filing of Plaintiffs' complaints appears to consist of offensive messages that Defendants attribute to the "Anonymous Gene" persona. Defendants claim, without proof, that this persona is "working with" Plaintiffs' counsel. But Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that she has no contact or connection with the Gene persona. Based on this record, at least with respect to the exhibits showing harassment by "Anonymous Gene," Defendants have not carried their burden to show good cause for the extensive relief that they seek…. Defendants also seek permission to proceed pseudonymously by using only their first names. A "party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity." [In the Ninth Circuit,] "To determine whether to allow a party to proceed anonymously when the opposing party has objected, a district court must balance five factors: '(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears, … (3) the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation,' (4) the prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) the public interest." … To the first factor, the claimed threats are severe due to their violence and graphic nature, and extensiveness. As to the second factor, "[t]o judge the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fears, [the court] must consider the surrounding context…." And a threat is reasonable if "a reasonable person would believe that the threat might actually be carried out." Considering that context, the Court does not find that the Defendants have shown that the threats they face might be carried out. First, Defendant points only to anonymous threats online. Courts have noted that anonymous online threats are not likely to result in actual harm. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools (9th Cir. 2010) ("The magistrate judge correctly recognized that many times people say things anonymously on the internet that they would never say in another context and have no intention of carrying out."). Second, most of the threats have been occurring for years and significantly predate the filing of the complaint. For example, Defendants point to a 2021 letter from an academic institution, apparently attended by one of the Defendants, stating that it had received reports that Defendants had engaged in "concerning online activities" and would be monitoring Defendants' online presence. And Defendants cite considerable discussion on social media in 2022 concerning the allegations against Defendant. The online threats since the suit was filed appear to come from one source, the "Anonymous Gene" persona. Defendants do not allege that any physical threats have come to fruition or increased in intensity since Plaintiffs filed their complaints. In this context, a reasonable person would likely not "believe that the threat might actually be carried out." To be sure, at least one court has granted anonymity to plaintiffs facing online threats of physical violence, not unlike that described by Defendants here, sent directly by email to their counsel. See Doe v. GitHub (N.D. Cal. 2023) (emails threatening violence "on the basis of their involvement in this lawsuit" meant that first two Advanced Textile factors weighed in favor of anonymity). This case is different from GitHub because those threats were more imminent and directly connected with the suit, since they were sent just before and after the filing of the complaint and were sent to the plaintiffs' counsel. Thus, it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear that the threats might come to pass. By contrast, the threats that Defendants point to have been going on for years, apparently without increasing severity. That fact also distinguishes the case from Doe I Through XXIII v. Advanced Textile (9th Cir. 2000), in which the plaintiffs faced an imminent threat of being fired from their jobs and summarily deported. In short, the lack of imminency of the threat makes their fears of harm less reasonable. As to the third factor, vulnerability requires a closer connection between the Defendants' circumstances and the harm they seek to avoid. For example, in Advanced Textile, the harm that the plaintiff textile workers sought to avoid was retaliation, including firing by their employers for filing the lawsuit. Their immigrant worker recruitment contracts did not permit them "to quit working for one employer and seek employment at another factory," which made them particularly vulnerable to that threat of firing. The employer defendants in that case "apparently also ha[d] the power to have foreign workers deported almost instantly." The connection between the harm threatened and the plaintiffs' particular circumstances supported the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs had shown the third factor of the test. But here, Defendants do not allege the same level of connection. The only harm that they seek to avoid is physical violence (which the Court has concluded, based on the present record, is not likely to occur) and the purported further spreading of their PII, which has already occurred and has been occurring since before the filing of the suit. The fourth factor favors pseudonymity. Plaintiffs make no specific argument as to why they would be prejudiced by Defendants' pseudonymity, such as by impairing their ability to "litigate the case [and] investigate the claims." … Further, courts have generally held that no prejudice results to the nonmoving party where they already know the identity of the moving party. Plaintiffs already know the identities of Defendants and thus would not be prejudiced by their proceeding pseudonymously. Finally, the fifth factor weighs against pseudonymity. "The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names," a presumption "loosely related to the public's right to open courts and the right of private individuals to confront their accusers." And this "common law right[ ] of access to the courts and judicial records are not taken lightly." Id. Further, the Court notes that Defendants appear to have made extensive public statements about the case and the harassment they have faced, including by uploading several YouTube videos. The Court thus finds that the Advanced Textile factors weigh against granting Defendants' pseudonymity request…. Lisa D. Haba (The Haba Law Firm, P.A.), Margaret Elizabeth Mabie, James R. Marsh, and Robert Y. Lewis (Marsh Law Firm PLLC), Jennifer Freeman (Freeman Lewis LLP), and Susanna Southworth (Restore the Child PLLC) represent one or both plaintiffs. The post Alleged Threats Against Alleged Groomers / Sex Traffickers of Minors Don't Justify Sealing of Personal Information / Pseudonymity appeared first on Reason.com.
09.03.2026 15:35 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] No Second Amendment "Right to Build Solar-Powered Greenhouses" So Judge Joshua Wolson (E.D. Pa.) held yesterday in Nellom v. Shapiro, unsurprisingly. An excerpt, from the Factual Allegations section: Congress passed the "Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act" in 2021, which resulted in the "Justice40 Initiative mission of Sustainability of our nation via renewable. The Department of Energy then created the National Community Solar Partnership (NCSP) to "advise on placing in low income communities." Mr. Nellom mentions a "National Renewable Energy Laboratory $8.2 million prize money $400k to the winners via HeroX online platform." He asserts that the "essence of the proposed project, to develop greenhouse with solar installations as a way of creating power generating and job producing community hubs encouraging food sovereignty and economic health is a great idea." The project would apparently build 4,800 square foot greenhouses with solar panel roof systems to produce renewable food, energy, water production, and job effects. He claims that "children have a fundamental right to benefit from learning to create a sustainable renewable future as a nation." He claims a Second Amendment right of self-defense that "include[s] a fundamental right to grow food to survive, right to bear arms is based upon." As relief, Mr. Nellom seeks to have the Governors of Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico "file an answer showing awareness of this opportunity to advance youth toward the more perfect union we are all entitled found in a nation learning to grow together comfortably in Greenhouses." The judge rejects the claims, and adds: Over the past 25 years, Mr. Nellom has filed 24 civil cases in this Court, none of which proceeded beyond the pleading stage of the litigation, including 12 such cases in the past five years. This Complaint, which presents generalized grievances and frivolous claims without payment of the filing fee gives me reason to believe that, without an injunction, he will continue to file cases that lack serious merit with no economic consequence to himself, thereby wasting scarce judicial resources. Thus, I will enter an Order that directs Mr. Nellom to show cause why I should not limit his ability to file future lawsuits pro se in this Court without paying the filing fee should not be enjoined unless he includes with his complaint and in forma pauperis application a certification that a licensed attorney has signed, indicating that the claims he seeks to present have arguable merit. The claim must include the attorney's bar number and contact information. The anticipated injunction would require the Clerk of Court to return to Mr. Nellom any new case submissions that fail to comply, without docketing them. The post No Second Amendment "Right to Build Solar-Powered Greenhouses" appeared first on Reason.com.
09.03.2026 14:38 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 1
[Eugene Volokh] Lawsuit Over Cancellation of April 2024 Pro-Palestine Protest at U Texas Can Go Forward From Heilrayne v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, decided Jan. 27 by Judge David Ezra (W.D. Tex.) but just recently posted on Westlaw: On April 23, 2024, the PSC [Palestine Solidarity Committee] at UT posted a notice on their Instagram account describing a protest for the following day. The notice advertised a walk-out of class, a meeting at Greg Plaza, and a "march to occupy the lawn." The post stated: "In the footsteps of our comrades at Columbia SJP, Rutgers-New Brunswick, Yale, and countless others across the nation, we will be establishing THE POPULAR UNIVERSITY FOR GAZA and demanding our administration divest from death." On April 24, the PSC posted again with a proposed schedule of events, including a walk-out of class, a guest speaker, two teach-ins, an art workshop, and study and food breaks, with the final event scheduled for 7:00 p.m. In response, UT preemptively cancelled the event by sending notices to PSC student representatives, with one such notice dated April 23, 2024, and four others dated April 24, 2024. In those notices, UT states its reasons for cancellation as follows: The Palestine Solidarity Committee student organization's event "Popular University for Gaza," which is planned for tomorrow, has declared intent to violate our policies and rules, and disrupt our campus operations. Such disruptions are never allowed and are especially damaging while our students prepare for the end of the semester and final exams. For these reasons, this event may not proceed as planned. However, Plaintiffs allege such notice was not communicated to the broader student body or public until the protest was underway, at which time UT released its Event Cancellation Notice, dated April 23, 2024, to the press…. Plaintiffs were arrested and also subject to probation or deferred suspension as university discipline. They sued, claiming this violated the First and Fourth Amendments. The court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the April 24 protest was canceled based on its viewpoint: The Court finds that Plaintiffs plead facts that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, allege that the April 24, 2024 protest was cancelled because of the group's viewpoint and perceived association with the pro-Palestine protest movement. This is further supported by Plaintiffs' allegations that the University has treated other student organizations with a reputation for "provocative demonstrations" differently, including not cancelling a Young Conservatives of Texas ("YCT") demonstration that was anticipated to attract counter-protestors and controversy on campus…. And the court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that their arrests and disciplinary actions were retaliation for their First-Amendment-protected activity: Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts that, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, draw a reasonable inference that these adverse actions were motivated against their exercise of protected speech. Plaintiffs have alleged that only pro-Palestine protestors were subject to arrests and discipline, while counter-protestors at the scene of the protest were not. Plaintiffs also allege facts suggesting certain Officer Defendants were given a quota of pro-Palestinian protestors to arrest. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege similar protests on UT's campus on different topics have not resulted in arrests or prior cancellation. To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot assert retaliatory arrest claims under Nieves v. Barlett (2019), the Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. Defendants cite Nieves for the proposition that a plaintiff must "plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest" to assert a viable First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. They suggest that should the Court find the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, that finding is fatal to any accompanying First Amendment retaliation claims. However, in Gonzalez v. Trevino (2024), the Supreme Court clarified the standard in Nieves and recognized a narrow exception where a plaintiff produces "objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." The Court finds that even if Plaintiffs did not adequately plead the absence of probable cause, they have alleged sufficient facts at this stage to permit their case to fall within the "narrow exception" identified in Nieves and Gonzalez. As previously discussed, Plaintiffs have alleged that similarly situated counter-protestors were not subject to arrest or student discipline, and that past protests by similarly situated student organizations were not treated in the same manner. The Court finds these allegations sufficient at this stage to circumvent any bar to Plaintiffs' claims articulated in Nieves…. The court concluded that the case could therefore proceed as to some defendants in their official capacities, to the extent plaintiffs are being sued to have the discipline removed from their records. But the court also held that the defendants were protected from personal liability by qualified immunity, because "it appears unsettled whether the rights Plaintiff claims are violated are 'clearly established'": The Supreme Court recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. (1969) that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," extending First Amendment protections to students in public schools. In that seminal case on First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court found there were no facts in the record "which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities." In doing so, the Court also acknowledged a school's ability to constrain speech in limited circumstances where there is evidence that an otherwise protected activity will result in such a substantial disruption. Under those circumstances, "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." However, Tinker was also a case about students in a K-12 public school, not a public university like UT. Plaintiffs urge the Court that applying Tinker on a campus full of adults would "eviscerate First Amendment protections at colleges and universities" and that the age of the Tinker plaintiffs is of "paramount importance." However, the Court here is not tasked with determining whether Tinker applies on college campuses; instead, the Court's role here is to determine whether the principle that Tinker is inapplicable to college campuses was "clearly established" such that a reasonable official could not have relied on that case in cancelling the April 24th protest and arresting and disciplining students involved…. [N]either the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has definitively answered whether Tinker applies in higher education settings…. Thus, Defendants could have reasonably forecasted that the April 24th protest would become a substantial disruption to school activities, given the national context of similar protests also titled "The Popular University for Gaza." Subsequent discipline also could have reasonably been viewed as justified in light of the University's cancellation of the protest. Regardless of whether these decisions were correct, or whether such a reliance on Tinker was misplaced, the facts do not demonstrate the kind of "plainly incompetent" decisions that would survive qualified immunity and sustain an individual-capacity action against these officials. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' individual-capacity claims against Defendants as to their First Amendment causes of action are barred by qualified immunity …. The post Lawsuit Over Cancellation of April 2024 Pro-Palestine Protest at U Texas Can Go Forward appeared first on Reason.com.
09.03.2026 13:41 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Philosophy Prof, Discussion of Adult-Child Sex Bans, and the First Amendment SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor had been barred from campus over podcast questioning illegality and immorality of adult-child sexual contact; a federal court has just allowed his First Amendment claim to go forward.
09.03.2026 12:44 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 1
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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 9, 1937 3/9/1937: President Roosevelt delivers a fireside chat on his Court-packing plan.   The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 9, 1937 appeared first on Reason.com.
09.03.2026 11:47 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Court Upholds New York's Limits on Unauthorized Practice of Law From Upsolve, Inc. v. James, decided Friday by Judge Lewis Kaplan (S.D.N.Y.) (for the earlier decision reaching the opposite result, see this post): The nonprofit Upsolve, Inc., wishes to train non-lawyers like the Rev. John Udo-Okon to provide free legal advice to consumers facing debt-collection lawsuits. But that conduct would violate New York's prohibition on the practice of law by anyone other than a licensed attorney. The question in this case is whether Upsolve and the Rev. Udo-Okon have a First Amendment right to engage in their proposed course of conduct notwithstanding the state's licensing law. For the reasons that follow, they do not…. In earlier proceedings, Judge Paul A. Crotty granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their free-speech claim, Judge Crotty held that the UPL Rules were a content-based regulation of speech that likely could not survive strict scrutiny…. In September 2025, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court agreed with Judge Crotty that, as applied to "convey[ing] … legal advice to a client," the UPL Rules regulate speech. But it held that the UPL Rules are content neutral and therefore subject to only intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded for reconsideration of plaintiffs' entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief under that lower standard…. Under the First Amendment, a state may pass no law abridging "the freedom of speech." This provision generally gives everyone a right to express themselves through words or conduct. In deciding a First Amendment challenge, the first step is to determine whether the law at issue restricts expression—that is, whether "the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message." In this case, the Second Circuit already has held that "New York's UPL statutes, as applied to Plaintiffs, constitute a regulation of speech." The next step in a First Amendment analysis is to determine whether the law's applicability to particular speech turns on "the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." If so, the law is generally considered "content based" and subject to strict scrutiny. If, instead, the law is justified "without reference to the content of the regulated speech," the law is considered "content neutral" and subject to intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit has determined that New York's UPL Rules "are content neutral and thus subject only to intermediate scrutiny." The final step (and the only one at issue here) is the application of intermediate scrutiny on which the government bears the burden of proof. Content-neutral regulations of speech are lawful only if they (1) "advance[ ] important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech" and (2) "[do] not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests." Under the first prong of this standard, the government must show that the challenged law seeks to address governmental interests that are "important" and "real" (as opposed to "merely conjectural") and that the regulation will address the problem "in a direct and material way." Under the second prong, the government must show that the regulation does not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary" to further the government's interests. The regulation need not be "the least speech-restrictive means" of addressing the problem. Rather, a court must afford the government a certain "latitude" and may not invalidate a law "simply because [it] concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." So long as a regulation is narrowly tailored to advancing governmental interests that "would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation," a court must defer to a government's reasonable determination about "how much protection of [those interests] is wise and how that level of [protection] is to be attained." It follows that the validity of a content-neutral regulation "depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government's interests in an individual case." The government often will need to adduce evidence to demonstrate that a regulation withstands intermediate scrutiny—such as proof that obvious, substantially less-speech-restrictive alternatives would not advance the government's interests just as effectively. But a court may conclude that a law is narrowly tailored to important government interests at the pleading stage, without resort to extrinsic evidence…. New York has a "well-established interest in regulating attorney conduct and in maintaining ethical behavior and independence among the members of the legal profession." It cannot reasonably be disputed that this interest qualifies as "important"—indeed, the Supreme Court has described it as "compelling" and "substantial." The goal of such regulations is to protect the integrity of "the primary governmental function of administering justice" as well as to "protect the public from ignorance, inexperience and unscrupulousness." The UPL Rules, in conjunction with the qualifications for licensure, clearly further these interests. The regulations require that those wishing to practice law obtain legal education, pass examinations designed to measure their competency to practice law, and demonstrate that they have the moral character and fitness to serve as an officer of the court. "[L]icensure based on specified standards of education, experience, and testing" is a form of regulation long recognized "directly and materially to alleviate concerns about ignorant, incompetent, and/or deceptive" conduct by professionals…. The complaint itself acknowledges that the UPL Rules "are designed to protect consumers from the risk of unreliable or unscrupulous representation and thereby increase public faith in the justice system," and that the law serves those purposes "in many applications." The state's interests are particularly strong here. In the context of plaintiffs' lawsuit, the UPL rules are being applied to the giving of individualized legal advice about how to respond to a pending lawsuit, including what legal defenses to raise (or not raise). That advice will be given in an organized setting in which clients will be asked to sign a "User Agreement" in exchange for receiving assistance from non-lawyers who will identify themselves as "Justice Advocates." Many of the risks that the licensure of attorneys guards against are at or near their apices in this context. A person without proper legal training may provide incompetent advice that prejudices a client's legal rights. Or a person with questionable moral character may proceed in a representation despite a clear conflict of interest or advise a client to make statements that mislead the court. Ensuring that anyone providing formal advice on how to complete an Answer Form is "trained, examined and licensed" clearly advances the State's interests in avoiding those risks. Plaintiffs suggest that the UPL Rules do not advance the state's interests as applied to them because Justice Advocates would give "reliable, truthful, and non-misleading" advice. But those allegations—perhaps more properly "predictions"—are "beside the point." The question is whether the UPL Rules further the state's interests as applied to "the general circumstances of [plaintiffs'] acts," not as applied to plaintiffs' "individual case." Here, those general circumstances are the giving of legal advice, in an organized setting, to New Yorkers actively being sued. The licensing requirement directly advances the state's stated goals when "considering all the varied groups" that may seek to engage in that type of speech…. [T]he UPL Rules, as applied, are narrowly tailored as a matter of law. To start, the UPL Rules restrict only the giving of legal advice to a specific person about that person's individual legal problems. New York does not prohibit plaintiffs (or anyone else) from speaking publicly about legal issues, including through the publication of self-help materials. Plaintiffs would be free to post their Training Guide online or distribute it as a pamphlet, complete with all the same advice as to when each defense on the Answer Form should be raised. They would be free also to publicly decry the high rate of default judgments in debt-collection cases and to push for whatever policy reforms they deem necessary. The only thing plaintiffs cannot do is advise a specific person about his or her individual case—the circumstances in which incompetent and unscrupulous legal advice is most likely to be relied upon and thereby cause harm…. After substantially narrowing their scope by definition, the UPL Rules impose a restriction on speech rather than an outright prohibition. Anyone can give legal advice to individual clients so long as they obtain a license. To obtain such a license, a person must satisfy educational, testing, and character requirements that are tailored to the state's interests in avoiding ignorant, incompetent, and unethical conduct. New York does not need to take plaintiffs' word when they say that Justice Advocates will provide only "truthful and non-misleading advice" …. Further demonstrating that New York carefully has considered the need to balance competing interests in this area, Justice Advocates could qualify for an exemption from the licensing requirement by completing only two semesters of law school and finding an approved, lawyer-run program to supervise them. The only remaining issue is plaintiffs' contention that the licensing requirements are too burdensome as applied to them. As Judge Crotty's thoughtful opinion noted, there is no doubt that New York could "impose targeted trainings or educational standards on Plaintiffs short of a full Bar certification." And the complaint alleges that some states and federal agencies permit non-lawyers to perform certain legal work. Such alternatives might demonstrate that the UPL Rules are not the least restrictive means of addressing the state's interests. But this Court is applying intermediate, not strict, scrutiny. It may not strike down the UPL Rules "simply because [it] concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Rather, because the UPL Rules are substantially related to advancing the state's legitimate interests, the Court must defer to New York's reasonable decision about "how much protection of [those interests] is wise and how that level of [protection] is to be attained." Accordingly, "[t]hose alternatives do not alter [the Court's] tailoring analysis." The UPL Rules are narrowly tailored for the reasons just explained. They apply only to individualized legal advice, leaving much law-related speech unregulated, and they prohibit a person from speaking only until he or she has obtained sufficient training in the law, permitting anyone willing to satisfy those requirements free to speak as he or she wishes. For those reasons, and as applied to the type of speech in which plaintiffs seek to engage, the UPL Rules advance the state's content-neutral interests without burdening a substantial amount of speech that is unlikely to bring about the evils against which the rules are directed. Beyond that, the Court cannot second-guess the New York Legislature's reasoned, policy-laden decision as to how much training and experience is enough training and experience—a decision that goes merely to "how much protection of [the government's interests] is wise." Plaintiffs' misplaced reliance on McCullen v. Coakley underscores that conclusion. There, Massachusetts had enacted a law that prohibited essentially all speech within a 35-foot radius of any abortion clinic during business hours. After reciting various alternatives that would have "burden[ed] substantially less speech" and that appeared readily capable of furthering the government's interests, such as laws targeted at harassment and obstruction, the Court held the law was not narrowly tailored. The difference between a blanket prohibition on speech near abortion clinics and a law prohibiting only harassing or obstructive conduct near abortion clinics, is not the same as the difference between imposing some educational, testing, and fitness requirements and imposing less educational, testing, and fitness requirements. A ban on any speech within a geographic area unquestionably "suppress[es] a great quantity of speech that does not cause the evils that [the ban] seeks to eliminate." An alternative that bans only harassment would substantially narrow that overbroad scope. In contrast, New York's law requiring a license to give one-on-one legal advice will advance the state's interests in a substantial number of its applications to speech like the AJM. Tweaking the prerequisites for licensure would not substantially alter the amount of speech burdened by the law. No amount of extrinsic evidence could demonstrate that obtaining a law degree, passing standardized tests and a course on New York law, and demonstrating one's character and fitness to practice law are requirements so unreasonably burdensome that the state has exceeded the "latitude" it enjoys to "design regulatory solutions to address content-neutral interests." … Matthew J. Lawson (Assistant AG) represents the state. The post Court Upholds New York's Limits on Unauthorized Practice of Law appeared first on Reason.com.
08.03.2026 18:41 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 8, 1841 3/8/1841: Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's birthday. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 8, 1841 appeared first on Reason.com.
08.03.2026 12:02 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
08.03.2026 07:17 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Federal Government Lawyer's Filings Appear to Include "Fabricated Quotations and Misstatements of Case Holdings" From Magistrate Judge Robert Numbers (E.D.N.C.) Monday in Fivehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Defense; the government's lawyer has been a member of the bar for almost 30 years, and has worked in the U.S. Attorney's office since 2009 (according to an article in Bloomberg Law by Ben Penn): The conduct at issue includes: 1. The inclusion of fabricated quotations and misstatements of case holdings in Defendants' response to Fivehouse's motion to supplement the administrative record (D.E. 86), including citations to Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009), Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 637 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2011), and Sierra Club v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018). 2. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion concerning compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 16 (D.E. 79), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990). 3. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion asking the court to take judicial notice of certain matters (D.E. 80), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990). 4. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation from 32 C.F.R. § 199.21(d) in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion for a preliminary injunction (D.E. 39). 5. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation from 32 C.F.R. § 199.21(d) in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 90). 6. Making false or misleading statements regarding how and why the fabricated quotations and misstatements appeared in D.E. 86. If established, such conduct may implicate North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). {In a surreply [related to the allegations in D.E. 86, the government's lawyer] stated that he "inadvertently included incorrect citations to case law from this Circuit," attributing the errors to the "inadvertent filing of an unfinalized draft document."} The court set a hearing on the matter, and added, Because of the seriousness of these issues, the court requests that one or more members of the leadership of the United States Attorney's Office attend and participate. The court also encourages the United States Attorney to review this matter in advance of the hearing and to take any corrective action deemed appropriate. The court will consider any such action in determining whether sanctions are warranted and, if so, their nature.   The post Federal Government Lawyer's Filings Appear to Include "Fabricated Quotations and Misstatements of Case Holdings" appeared first on Reason.com.
07.03.2026 13:14 👍 1 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 7, 1965 3/7/1965: Civil rights marchers are attacked by the police in Selma, Alabama. The event would become known as "Bloody Sunday." The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 7, 1965 appeared first on Reason.com.
07.03.2026 12:17 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
07.03.2026 08:29 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] California Appeals Court Upholds Trial Court Order That Cited Hallucinated Cases The nonexistent cases were first introduced by opposing counsel, but the appellant's lawyer didn't spot the error at the trial court, and submitted a proposed order to the trial court that cited those cases. That, the appeals court held, meant that appellant forfeited the right to challenge the decision.
06.03.2026 22:02 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Jonathan H. Adler] Previewing Suncor Energy v. Boulder County A Federalist Society forum on the first big case of OT 2026.
06.03.2026 22:02 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[John Ross] Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal Lies, damned lies, and statutes of limitations.
06.03.2026 21:05 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Mark Movsesian] The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana 10 Commandments Law The en banc court pushes pause--for now
06.03.2026 12:32 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 6, 1857 3/6/1857: Dred Scott v. Sandford decided.   The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 6, 1857 appeared first on Reason.com.
06.03.2026 12:32 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
06.03.2026 08:44 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Josh Blackman] The First Question From The Florida Supreme Court's Newest Member: "Is your position more like Justice Gorsuch in Bostock or Justice Alito in dissent?" The answer: "I think Justice Gorsuch was wildly incorrect."
06.03.2026 03:59 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] The Zizians and the Second Amendment For the backstory on the Zizians, see Investigations Into 6 Killings Look to a Fringe Group Known as the Zizians (N.Y. Times, Remy Tumin & Kate Christobek), which notes, among other things, that "The group's goals aren't completely clear but online writings about their beliefs touch upon veganism, artificial intelligence and gender identity. From U.S. v. LaSota, decided today by Judge James Bredar (D. Md.); LaSota is Ziz, the Zizians' apparent leader: Pending before the Court is Defendant Jack LaSota's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment. {The Indictment names Defendant as "Jack LaSota" and the Government uses male pronouns to refer to LaSota in its briefing. However, LaSota states that her name is "Ziz LaSota" and that she is a transgender woman who uses female pronouns. The Court refers to Defendant as "Jack LaSota" here to match the Indictment but will use female pronouns to refer to her, in accordance with her preference.} … According to the Indictment, LaSota was a fugitive from justice, and while knowing that she was a fugitive from justice, she possessed multiple firearms as well as ammunition. Specifically, she is alleged to have possessed a scoped .50 caliber rifle, a 9×19mm handgun, approximately 420 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, and approximately 54 rounds of 9×19mm ammunition. In their briefing, the parties provide several additional background facts. They explain that LaSota was previously charged in state criminal proceedings in California and Pennsylvania. In these cases, LaSota was charged with one felony and multiple misdemeanors. LaSota claims that all of the alleged criminal conduct was nonviolent. The Government explains that LaSota missed court hearings in both cases, so in both of them, bench warrants were issued for her arrest. Then, in February 2025, LaSota was found with the above-described firearms and ammunition, and she was arrested by Maryland local police. A federal grand jury then charged LaSota with being a fugitive from justice in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). LaSota's Motion to Dismiss argues that § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to her case…. The parties … debate whether fugitives are among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment. As the Government notes, the Fourth Circuit has held that felons are not among "the people" because they are not "law-abiding." But in several recent cases, the Fourth Circuit has declined to address whether certain other categories of people—felony indictees and domestic violence misdemeanants—are included in "the people." The Court is attracted to the Government's argument that fugitives are most akin to felons and are thus not included among "the people" because neither group is "law-abiding." But given the disagreements on how to define "the people" both at the Fourth Circuit and between the Circuits,and considering that resolution of this specific question is not strictly necessary in order for the Court to rule on the instant Motion, the Court declines to rule on this issue today. Instead, the Court will decide the facial challenge at Bruen step two because it certainly fails at that step…. To determine whether § 922(g)(2) "is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition," the Court must "ascertain whether [§ 922(g)(2)] is 'relevantly similar' to laws that our tradition is understood to permit." … The Fourth Circuit has held multiple times "that our historical tradition of gun regulation allows 'status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms.'" That is because early state legislatures "could prohibit gun ownership by groups of persons that the legislature deemed 'potentially violent or dangerous.'" Thus, Congress can now "legislate using proxies for dangerousness." For instance, in Hunt, the Fourth Circuit upheld Congress' ability to impose a lifetime ban on felons possessing firearms. And in Jackson, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "although 'felony indictment' is a less effective proxy for dangerousness than 'felony conviction,' § 922(n)'s temporary and partial disarmament burdens Second Amendment rights far less severely than does § 922(g)(1)'s lifetime ban." … Jackson's rationale applies to § 922(g)(2). Fugitives are more dangerous than felony indictees because they have ordinarily been charged with a crime and fled from prosecution. But like felony indictees, they are only temporarily disarmed. Thus, fugitive status is a valid proxy for dangerousness (the "why") and § 922(g)(2) permissibly requires temporary disarmament (the "how"). Accordingly, LaSota's facial challenge fails on this basis as well…. The Court now turns to the as-applied challenge. LaSota argues that she only fled from prosecutions for "non-violent offenses, comprised largely of misdemeanors." Thus, in her view, § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to her because she is not a fugitive from prosecution for "serious crimes." But that is ultimately irrelevant because, as the Fourth Circuit held for § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits felons from possessing firearms), this Court holds that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(2) are categorically barred. When Congress passed the Gun Control Act in 1968, it made a categorical judgment that all "fugitives from justice" were dangerous enough to be disarmed. And critically, that included fugitives from prosecutions for misdemeanors and nonviolent crimes…. Just as legislatures 250 years ago determined, for instance, that all non-oath-takers were too dangerous to possess firearms, Congress has now determined that all fugitives from justice—whether they are fleeing felonies, misdemeanors, violent crimes, or nonviolent crimes—are too dangerous to possess firearms. To be sure, LaSota rejects the notion that someone fleeing prosecution for misdemeanors and nonviolent crimes could be dangerous. But the power to make that determination is entrusted to Congress, not to LaSota and not to this Court. As the Hunt court explained, "the power to determine the content of the criminal law is serious business. But legislatures have always had that power, and it is subject to few constitutional restraints." Here, Congress exercised that power to classify all fugitives from justice as dangerous enough to be disarmed. That statute is "relevantly similar" to the numerous Founding-era laws that categorically disarmed "dangerous persons." And that is precisely the "historical analogue" that Bruen and Rahimi require for a statute to withstand scrutiny under the Second Amendment. Therefore, the Court concludes that "there is no requirement for an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person" accused of being a fugitive from justice in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(2). Jared Beim represents the federal government. The post The Zizians and the Second Amendment appeared first on Reason.com.
06.03.2026 00:11 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 1
[Eugene Volokh] Court Blocks Florida Gov. DeSantis's Executive Order Designating CAIR as Terrorist Organization The order "prevents CAIR or 'any person known to have provided material support or resources' to CAIR 'from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or privilege'" from Florida state or local governments.
05.03.2026 23:14 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Interview with Judge Lawrence VanDyke at the University of Florida We talk about his background, his path to the bench, and why he does things differently on the Ninth Circuit.
05.03.2026 21:20 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Ilya Somin] Twenty-Four States Led by Oregon File Lawsuit Challenging Trump's Section 122 Tariffs The massive new tariffs are illegal, just like the IEEPA tariffs previously invalidated by the Supreme Court.
05.03.2026 18:32 👍 1 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
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[Ilya Somin] Twenty-Four States Led by Oregon File Lawsuit Challenging Trump's Section 122 Tariffs The massive new tariffs are illegal, just like the IEEPA tariffs previously invalidated by the Supreme Court.
05.03.2026 18:29 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Ilya Somin] My New Dispatch Article on "Why Donald Trump's Iran War is Unconstitutional" The article explains why the war requires congressional authorization,and why this requirement is important.
05.03.2026 16:35 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Tom Merrill] How the Supreme Court's Conception of Its Role Contributes to the Deformation of the Constitution The Court's law-declaration approach not only departs from its dispute-resolution premise but risks yielding a faulty product.
05.03.2026 13:45 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 5, 1934 3/5/1934: Nebbia v. New York decided.   The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 5, 1934 appeared first on Reason.com.
05.03.2026 12:48 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
05.03.2026 08:04 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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[Ilya Somin] US Court of International Trade Orders Refund of All Illegally Collected IEEPA Tariffs Importantly, the Court ordered payment of refunds even to those businesses who have not filed a lawsuit to claim them.
05.03.2026 02:22 👍 0 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Court Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against Northwestern Over Alleged Post-Oct. 7 Anti-Semitism [1.] From Judge John Robert Blakey's decision yesterday in Doe v. Northwestern Univ., the allegations in the Complaint (note that at this stage they are of course just allegations): In the days following [the October 7] attack, several members of Northwestern's faculty in Evanston posted about the attack on social media, with one stating "resistance is justified when a people are occupied." Another professor, Steven Thrasher, said a New York Times story on sexual assault allegations relating to the October 7 attack was "widely discredited," and noted that a story by the Guardian was disturbingly "similar." School programs like the Northwestern Women's Center and the Asian American Studies Program also made statements on social media. The Women's Center shared a brochure from the Palestinian Feminist Collective with short articles on protests and advocacy, protest chants, hashtags like #AlAqsaFlood, and website links to suggested readings about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Asian American Studies Program made a statement on Islamophobia and disputed reports that Hamas had "beheaded babies." Student groups like Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP") issued statements accusing "Zionists" of "whitewashing" and legitimizing the "genocide" of Palestinians, which several Northwestern faculty members signed onto. Northwestern maintains a satellite campus in Qatar ("Northwestern Qatar"), through which students and faculty in Evanston and Qatar may visit the other campus in exchange programs. At Northwestern Qatar, faculty also posted on social media about the Hamas terror attack. Professor in Residence Khaled AL-Hroub called for a Third Intifada to "sweep away the occupier," while an assistant professor in residence tweeted the "chain must be broken," in reference to the Hamas incursion into Israel. AL-Hroub also participated in a radio interview where he said he had not seen "any credible media reporting" that Hamas killed women and children on October 7th, prompting Northwestern to issue a statement condemning the "attempt to minimize or misrepresent the horrific killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas." On April 25, 2024, student demonstrators at Northwestern's Evanston campus organized an encampment of tents, protest signs, and flags on Dearing Meadow, the campus' central lawn. Within the encampment, several individuals dressed up as members of Hamas, demanding to know whether others spoke Hebrew. Some of the signs featured blatant antisemitic imagery, like a slashed-out Star of David or a drawing of Northwestern's President Schilll—a Jewish man—with horns and blood dripping from his mouth. In and around the encampment, several demonstrators physically assaulted or shouted slurs at Jewish students. During the encampment, participants also shouted slogans like "Intifada, Intifada, Long live the Intifada," "Globalize the Intifada," "Resistance is justified when people are occupied," and "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free." When Jewish students attempted to document the encampment, they were physically assaulted, blocked from entering, or had phones and cameras knocked out of their possession. In a video statement to the Northwestern community, President Schill condemned such incidents of antisemitism, stating that the signs with a slashed-out Star of David or the drawing of him with horns left "no ambiguity" about their antisemitic nature. On the first day of the encampment, Northwestern issued statements declaring the encampment was prohibited and that students who refused to remove their tents would be subject to arrest. Northwestern Police cited several students who refused to remove their tents. Despite these efforts, the encampment persisted, and demonstrators declined Northwestern's offer to "peacefully assemble" in compliance with Northwestern policies. Seeing this, Northwestern decided to "move forward with other options to protect the safety of the community." While the encampment continued, Northwestern turned off the regularly scheduled lawn sprinklers on Dearing Meadow. Northwestern also allowed demonstrators, some not affiliated with the school, to access the Multicultural Center, normally accessible only to students. On April 29, 2025, four days after the encampment began, Northwestern reached an "agreement" with the encampment organizers. Under the agreement, demonstrators removed their tents from Deering Meadow, while Northwestern promised to cover the undergraduate tuition of five Palestinians, and to renovate a house for Middle Eastern, North African, and Muslim students. Northwestern also condemned the doxing of "any community member" and advised employers not to rescind job offers for students engaging in speech "protected by the First Amendment." {"Doxing" involves releasing someone's personal details onto the Internet in an easily accessible form and it may be used to humiliate, intimidate, threaten, or punish the identified individual.} Following the agreement, Northwestern SJP held an overnight sleepover on the lawn. Two days later, on May 1, 2024, student demonstrators held a "Strike for Gaza" on Northwestern's Evanston campus. Some professors cancelled classes so students could participate, while others lectured at the demonstration. Some of the posters at the demonstration stated, "resistance is justified when people are occupied #AlAqsaFlood," and participants repeated similar messages. During these on-campus demonstrations, Northwestern's school library asked demonstrators to "please consider saving your protest materials," inviting student demonstrators to submit materials for preservation in the University Archives. Northwestern also maintains a Campus Violence Prevention Plan aimed at disciplining any "community member" who engages in "unacceptable behavior" like "intimidating, threatening, or violent behaviors that affect the ability to learn, work, or live in the University environment." Under the plan, community members who display material that degrades a person or group, or causes harm or fear for one's safety remains "subject to disciplinary action." [2.] The court rejected plaintiffs' Title VI hostile environment harassment claim (though, as with the other claims, they can try to replead it with more specific factual allegations, if they think those allegations are well-founded): A school "can only be liable for harassment about which it has actual knowledge." School officials have actual knowledge "only of the incidents that they witness, or those that have been reported to them." Courts, therefore, have "focused on reports or observations in the record of inappropriate behavior to determine when school officials had actual notice." As a predicate matter, Plaintiffs must allege that a school official was aware of the "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" harassment. Yet in many instances here, Plaintiffs have not done so in the current complaint. Plaintiffs allege liability and predicate their claims of loss of access to educational benefits on a variety of incidents, all relating to demonstrations in the wake of Hamas' October 7 terrorist attack. They allege a Title VI violation based upon "many other incidents on campus" which contributed to the hostility they endured. But Plaintiffs do not plead any facts about what these "other incidents" involve; nor do they allege how these "other incidents" were reported to Northwestern officials, or that those officials otherwise had actual knowledge of such incidents. For example, John Doe 2 alleges that he was the subject of a "derogatory and harassing online post." Yet Plaintiffs do not allege anyone reported this post to Northwestern officials, or that Northwestern officials had actual knowledge of the post. Likewise, John Doe 3 attributes his loss of access to educational benefits to a variety of events, including "antisemitic rhetoric" being "shouted at him," online harassment, false accusations, his observation of posters at a May 1, 2024 demonstration, and an interaction with a protestor at that demonstration where the protestor said to him, "resistance is justified when people are occupied." Again, however, Plaintiffs do not allege that Northwestern had actual knowledge of the antisemitic rhetoric, online harassment, or false accusations John Doe 3 faced, or knowledge of the substance of his alleged harassment. Plaintiffs similarly do not allege that Northwestern officials had actual knowledge of the interaction between John Doe 3 and the protester at the May 1, 2024 demonstration. With no allegations that Northwestern had the requisite actual knowledge of these specific instances of harassment, Plaintiffs fail to properly allege a Title VI claim in connection with these incidents. Across all the alleged instances of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct (that certainly deprived Plaintiffs of access to educational opportunities as alleged), there is just one—the encampment—where Plaintiffs allege facts to show school officials had actual knowledge. There, Plaintiffs' claims of deliberate indifference [an element of the hostile educational environment claim -EV] also lack sufficient factual detail, but for a different reason. At the Deering Meadow encampment, numerous participants engaged in antisemitic harassment: dressing up as members of Hamas, displaying antisemitic signs, and assaulting or verbally harassing Jewish students. For Title VI liability to attach, however, Northwestern must have not only known about the conduct but been deliberately indifferent to it. Plaintiffs allege that Northwestern did nothing in the face of such offensive conduct and "allowed" the encampment to "clamor for five days uninterrupted." Plaintiffs add that Northwestern even encouraged, "accommodated," and "acquiesced to" the protesters: turning off its lawn sprinklers and awarding the protesters with "a bundle of goodies" in its negotiations to end the encampment. All of this, Plaintiffs argue, shows Northwestern was deliberately indifferent. Deliberate indifference is a "stringent standard of fault." The deliberate indifference standard "requires that the school's response not be clearly unreasonable, which is a higher standard than reasonableness." A school's response is sufficient "so long as it is not so unreasonable, under all the circumstances, as to constitute an 'official decision' to permit discrimination." CA school's response does not need to be perfect or successful to clear this standard, and even a negligent response is not necessarily unreasonable under Title VI. Depending upon the circumstances, a school's ultimate decision to impose no remedial measures could suffice and might not be "clearly unreasonable" or constitute deliberate indifference…. As currently alleged, … the allegations do not explain how Northwestern's conduct was clearly unreasonable or deliberately indifferent. Indeed, in the paragraphs immediately following Plaintiffs' allegations that Northwestern "allowed" the encampment to clamor "uninterrupted," Plaintiffs describe efforts by Northwestern officials to bring the encampment to an end…. Northwestern officials also publicly denounced the encampment and told demonstrators that the encampment was prohibited. Thereafter, some protestors refused demands to remove their tents, and they received citations from Northwestern Police; and then, after this initial approach failed to end the encampment, Northwestern explored "other options to protect the safety of the community and the continued operations of the Evanston campus." Working over the weekend, Northwestern officials negotiated the end of the encampment in four days, "a relatively short period compared to similar encampment activity on other college campuses." … Northwestern officials did not leave the encampment totally "undisturbed" or otherwise order law enforcement to stand down in the face of unlawful conduct. Instead, Northwestern unsuccessfully tried to discourage protesters with warnings and police citations, before negotiating for the encampment's conclusion, with a "purpose in returning civil order." Plaintiffs take issue with Northwestern's decision to explore "other options," and accuse Northwestern of accommodating or acquiescing to the encampment. But Title VI does not mandate a specific set of increasingly punitive measures to remove hostile environments, and courts "must hesitate to second guess" officials' judgments to find the appropriate response. [Northwestern] officials came to the "defensible conclusion that intervention could have triggered an even larger and more disruptive backlash," … deciding that a negotiation would bring a quicker and more peaceful resolution. In short, the legal question is not whether Northwestern "could have handled each situation better," but rather was Northwestern "so indifferent to known acts of harassment that it caused students to undergo harassment or made them more vulnerable to it, and thereby undermined the students' education." The current complaint lacks the requisite allegation to show Northwestern's indifference. {In the current complaint, the Plaintiffs also lack detail regarding the concrete deprivations of access to Northwestern's educational benefits. To state a valid Title VI claim, Plaintiffs must "plead with specificity that the conduct at issue had some 'concrete, negative effect' on their education." Courts have found concrete deprivations existed where plaintiffs alleged they "were forced to change their study habits or change schools, where they had a measurable drop in grades or increase in absenteeism, or where they developed anxiety sufficient to require intervention." For example, in Gartenberg [a previous case involving Cooper Union in New York], plaintiffs alleged they suffered from "intense anxiety and panic attacks," "engaged therapists, missed and/or dropped assignments," and one student delayed completion of their degree. There, the court concluded plaintiffs plausibly alleged a loss of educational benefits and opportunities. Similarly, in Canaan v. Carnegie Mellon University, the plaintiff alleged that she missed numerous lectures and many hours of an 18-credit course, was denied meetings with a mentor, and avoided community events associated with her school program. This, too, was sufficient to show a loss of educational benefits and opportunities. So too in Frankel v. Regents of University of California, where plaintiffs were blocked from entering classrooms and ultimately missed their final exams…. Here, among other things, Plaintiffs allege that they "heard hateful expressions when walking near the encampment," that they were subjected to verbal or online harassment, that they viewed a friend being struck by a protester, and that they generally observed unspecified "other incidents" but, again, lack details of the denials of access to Northwestern's resources or opportunities.} [3.] The court also concluded that plaintiffs hadn't plausibly alleged facts necessary to prevail under a straight-up intentional discrimination theory: Plaintiffs claim they have alleged discriminatory intent, through "discriminatory conduct of official Northwestern departments, and the school's lucrative partnership with Qatar and Al-Jazeera." Plaintiffs add that Northwestern's "lucrative partnership with Qatar and Al-Jazeera" provides further "motive" for Northwestern to overlook antisemitism, and to "placate its major overseas donor and institutional partners." Plaintiffs further claim, "faculty and staff at Northwestern Qatar call for violence against Jews and support Hamas, consistent with the Qatari government." Plaintiffs argue, then, that the "back-and-forth flow of Northwestern Qatar's faculty and students with Northwestern's Illinois campuses," combined with Northwestern's refusal to discipline "discriminatory conduct of its Northwestern Qatar faculty," "results in an unsafe campus for Jews at Northwestern." The unsafe campus ultimately leads to Plaintiffs' alleged deprivation of access to educational benefits: "a harassing campus climate that is a direct result of Northwestern's lopsided and discriminatory policy enforcement." Plaintiffs' theory, however, does not explain how Northwestern's decision to establish a campus in Qatar demonstrates discriminatory intent on the part of Northwestern, and their arguments remain predicated upon conclusory allegations. Plaintiffs also plead no facts explaining how Northwestern is acting to "placate" Qatar, and they allege no non-conclusory facts plausibly showing a connection between Northwestern's foreign partnerships and its actions toward antisemitism on its Evanston campus. At this stage, Plaintiffs must allege "adequate factual detail to lift" their claims "from mere speculative possibility to plausibility." Plaintiffs have not. The alleged connection between Qatari faculty and students and Northwestern's Evanston campus is also conclusory. Plaintiffs repeatedly complain that the relationship between Northwestern-Qatar and Northwestern-Evanston contributes to an unsafe environment for Plaintiffs in Evanston, but they plead no facts as to how. Though Plaintiffs complain that students from Qatar "participated in the major antisemitic event on campus"—the encampment—Plaintiffs' only factual support for this allegation is an image of a poster stating, "NU Qatar 4 a Free Palestine." By itself, this poster fails to plausibly show discriminatory harassment under Title VI. Plaintiffs complain that Qatari faculty sometimes speak at "lectures and presentations" on the Evanston campus through Northwestern's exchange program, but Plaintiffs plead no facts about any event in Evanston with a Qatari faculty member who engaged in discrimination. Plaintiffs also plead no facts showing that any of the Qatari faculty members named in the Complaint ever visited Northwestern's Evanston campus. In short, Plaintiffs' current allegations do not plausibly show how Qatari faculty and students created an unsafe environment for Plaintiffs in Evanston. Finally, even where the complaint alleges individual Northwestern faculty and staff made offensive posts on social media, it fails to allege how those posts precluded Plaintiffs from participating in, or denied them the benefits of, an educational program. Plaintiffs do not explain the details of how the social media posts "so eroded" their experience at Northwestern that they were "denied equal access to its resources or opportunities." Without any allegations that Plaintiffs even encountered the posts, or that the posts affected the programs Plaintiffs were enrolled in, the posts, without more, cannot form the basis of a Title VI claim. [4.] The court likewise concluded that plaintiffs hadn't sufficiently alleged that Northwestern "enforce[ed] its policies in one manner when it comes to Jewish students, while enforcing them in another when it comes to all other protected classes": Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged two comparator cases as evidence of this lopsided enforcement. First, when Northwestern responded to white supremacist stickers on campus by filing police reports, working with local authorities, and issuing a condemnation of the behavior. Second, when Northwestern announced its opposition to racism and police brutality in the wake of George Floyd's murder. Without more, however, these two comparators are insufficient to demonstrate discrimination under the indirect method, because Plaintiffs have not put forth "a single example of a similarly situated individual" outside their protected class that "received the response" Plaintiffs sought from Northwestern upon complaining of harassment. Here, Plaintiffs' reliance on the encampment also lacks the temporal connection to show that Northwestern's disciplinary decisions led to the "harassing campus climate." Plaintiffs' suggestion that Northwestern's past disciplinary decisions somehow led to the encampment is too conclusory to impose Title VI liability as alleged. Plaintiffs plead no facts establishing a plausible inference that past disciplinary decisions were a cause of the Deering Meadow encampment. [5.] Plaintiffs also sued for breach of contract, but the court didn't consider that issue: Having determined that Plaintiffs' federal claim must be dismissed, the Court need not yet decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law breach of contract claim…. "The usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." … Casey T. Grabenstein, Elizabeth Anne Thompson, James A. Morsch, Joshua W. B. Richards, and Megan Quinn Warshawsky (Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP) represent Northwestern. The post Court Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against Northwestern Over Alleged Post-Oct. 7 Anti-Semitism appeared first on Reason.com.
04.03.2026 17:49 👍 1 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0