Dr. Salah Ben Hammou

Burkina Faso has dissolved all political parties: why African coup leaders often turn on the people who supported them Once in power, military rulers have little incentive to share authority.

Burkina Faso’s junta has dissolved all political parties, concentrating power further and closing off space for independent civic life. 🛑

theconversation.com/burkina-faso...

#Politics

Burkina Faso has dissolved all political parties: why African coup leaders often turn on the people who supported them Once in power, military rulers have little incentive to share authority.

Latest with @africa.theconversation.com. I argue that Burkina Faso’s recent efforts to ban political parties fits into a broader pattern. Even coups that begin with public backing often see military leader turn against their own supporters and civilian allies.

theconversation.com/burkina-faso...

ICYMI: if you’ve ever wondered about coup contagion, this paper offers some insight

I appreciate it!

Following the Free Officers: Explaining the Politics of Coup Contagion and Containment Abstract. Observers have long posited that military coups can spread across borders, yet empirical support for such contagion remains inconsistent. We argu

Early Christmas gift: my latest study with @drpowell.bsky.social just went live over at International Studies Review.

Read it here:
academic.oup.com/isr/article/...

If you care about topics like coup contagion and authoritarian resilience, please check out our latest

Following the Free Officers: Explaining the Politics of Coup Contagion and Containment Abstract. Observers have long posited that military coups can spread across borders, yet empirical support for such contagion remains inconsistent. We argu

Early Christmas gift: my latest study with @drpowell.bsky.social just went live over at International Studies Review.

Read it here:
academic.oup.com/isr/article/...

Coup contagion? A rash of African power grabs suggests copycats are taking note of others’ success Since 2020, there have been 11 successful coups across Africa, and five thwarted attempts.

Final article of the year: sharing my latest with @drpowell.bsky.social at @us.theconversation.com

We’ve written before on Africa’s post-2020 coup wave and the question of contagion. This time, we explore how would-be plotters watch, learn, and act.

theconversation.com/coup-contagi...

This is one of those shows everyone needs to watch, start to end

This speaks to a broader issue I see with this site. Stories on issues in places other than the U.S. receive much less engagement. There’s increasingly little space to promote and discuss issues that are occurring globally. It’s like some form of U.S. exceptionalism in the reverse

Guinea-Bissau coup: election uncertainty has triggered military takeovers before The coup sends a signal that electoral rules and constitutional procedures can be overridden by force.

My Q&A interview on Guinea-Bissau's coup with the Conversation is now available. Read it here: theconversation.com/guinea-bissa...

Now that the coup has failed, we’re deploying troops to protect the government!!

This is the third coup in the last two months. It seems we’re starting to hit an uptick yet again in the coup wave, which had largely gone quiet since 2023.

Last September, there was a thwarted coup plot in Benin with alleged ties to the Burkinabe junta.

West Africa’s ‘coup cascade’ Guinea-Bissau takeover is the latest in the Sahel region, which has quietly become global epicentre of terrorism

Had some words of mine quoted in a recent article over @theweek.com on West Africa's coup wave.

theweek.com/world-news/g...

Just another day

Civil society on the ground is alleging that the incumbent, Embaló, instigated the coup and handed power to the military to stop the release of election results. If true, this would be an example of a common trend where losing incumbents instigate coups to stop the opposition’s ascent.

If this is what actually happened, then Embaló would do well to remember that even incumbents and civilians close to power who instigate coups are often shortchanged by their allies in fatigues once the dust settles.

The Varieties of Civilian Praetorianism: Evidence From Sudan’s Coup Politics - Salah Ben Hammou, 2024 This study explores the varieties of civilian praetorianism or the different ways in which civilians enable and support military coups. It specifically argues t...

For more on how this kind of process plays out (shameless plug), see here: journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Civil society on the ground is alleging that the incumbent, Embaló, instigated the coup and handed power to the military to stop the release of election results. If true, this would be an example of a common trend where losing incumbents instigate coups to stop the opposition’s ascent.

Guinea-Bissau’s presidential poll has already failed the credibility test What’s at stake in Guinea-Bissau’s election is a wider regional crisis in which incumbents erode legitimacy.

A military coup appears to have happened in Guinea-Bissau. The warning signs were there, leading up to Sunday's elections. @drpowell.bsky.social & I wrote about these warning signs last week over at @africa.theconversation.com.

theconversation.com/guinea-bissa...

Following the Free Officers title page and abstract

📢 New Paper Alert!

Happy to share that our article “Following the Free Officers: Explaining the Politics of Coup Contagion & Containment” — co-authored with @drpowell.bsky.social — is forthcoming in International Studies Review.

Are coups actually contagious, and if so, how?

🧵 below (1/)

I wrote this essay in the current Sudan issue of Transition Magazine titled "The Politics of Hunger" which argues that the current hunger crisis has been decades in the making. It begins with Nimeiri and looks at US engagement over the decades.

transitionmagazine.fas.harvard.edu/the-politics...

ICYMI

All in all, we hope this paper offers a fresh lens on the contagion debate. With the recent cascade of coups, it seems more relevant now than ever to understand how and when coups spread.

Link to accepted version here: salahbenhammou.com/wp-content/u... (10/10)

The Free Officers case is often considered a canonical case of coup contagion.

But its real value is in showing how conditional contagion can actually be: unfolding slowly and unevenly, as shifts in disposition and capacity take time to align, and as plots are disrupted before they surface. (9/)

In other words, contagion was happening — but being contained before it reached the surface.

Previous efforts to study contagion only counted successful or attempted coups. But throughout this period, vulnerable regimes were uncovering, disrupting, and preempting coup plots (8/)

Importantly, leaders weren't idle. They:

— purged officers
— restructured commands
— coup-proofed institutions
— enlisted foreign backers

These actions suppressed ability and disposition — often so effectively that many plots were never able to come to fruition. (7/)

Only later, once Nasser solidified power, survived Suez, and reshaped regional politics, did would-be plotters begin to:

1. See a compelling, revolutionary model (disposition)
2. Come into positions to develop the capacity to move (ability)

Contagion emerges — but often on an uneven timeline. (6/)

We demonstrate the framework through an analysis of the 1952 Free Officers coup in Egypt. Despite its eventual iconic status, it did not trigger an immediate wave. Why?

Because immediate post-1952 Egypt was uncertain and divided. It hadn’t yet adequately raised disposition elsewhere. (5/)

We bring the ability-disposition framework - long used in the study of coups - to the question of contagion.

Disposition — whether would-be plotters are willing to intervene
Ability — whether they possess the capacity to do so

A coup abroad becomes meaningful if it alters these conditions (4/)