While we still need more information to grasp the full picture, my earlier hypothesis—grounded in my previous research—appears broadly consistent with what we’re seeing.
@hanshtung
Political economy, political communication; University Excelsior Chair Professor, Yageo Prof of Political Economy/Associate Dean, School of Political Science and Economics @NTU_TW; formerly @Harvard https://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~hanstung/Home.html
While we still need more information to grasp the full picture, my earlier hypothesis—grounded in my previous research—appears broadly consistent with what we’re seeing.
This definitely marks a new political equilibrium, and it attests to the presence of earlier political struggles between Xi and Zhang.
“…gravely betrayed the trust… undermined the CMC Chairperson responsibility system… abetted political and corruption-related problems that weaken the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces… and damaged the image and authority of the CMC leadership.”
A newly (Jan 24) released editorial in the PLA’s official newspaper (www.shobserver.com/.../html/web...) is unusually blunt and helps us understand the nature of the episode by stating that Zhang and Liu:
It is more plausible that these moves reflected Zhang’s maneuvering—putting Xi on the back foot—ultimately culminating in Zhang’s own political downfall.
No matter how corrupt or incompetent those figures may have been, it makes little sense for Xi to purge them, since doing so would directly undermine his own authority and credibility. Purges of this scale also risked disrupting the PLA’s chain of command.
Moreover, I also take a fundamentally different view of how to interpret the purge of Xi’s protégés since 2023. I don’t think these were entirely Xi’s decisions.
Last November, the two attended a ceremony where the seating arrangement looked pretty odd: Xi and Zhang were placed at equal distance from the surrounding officials. This is highly unusual—Xi is supposed to be the unrivaled apex of the hierarchy, yet Zhang appeared to be treated as an equal.
For the past couple of months, I’ve shared with a few friends a photo (It’s also been picked up by some smaller news outlets.) that may hint at deeper rifts between Xi and Zhang (cpc.people.com.cn/.../2025/111...).
The news about Zhang Youxia’s investigation is enormous, and people have been trying to piece together what happened. That said, it isn’t entirely surprising.
Definitely a rare opportunity. The dialogue between James and VP Hsiao was absolutely fascinating. The past week was exhausting, but also immensely rewarding!
Check out PS's latest article by @fbkeller.bsky.social and @expertsurvey.bsky.social which highlights that while there is a diverse & global community of experts on Chinese politics, it is still dominated by US-based Academics.
Check it out here: doi.org/10.1017/S104...
#polisky #academisky
As a member of this community, I believe that studying ourselves is essential to recognizing our blind spots, correcting our biases, and improving the quality of our scholarship.
I’m especially thankful to colleagues in the China studies community around the world who generously responded to our requests and made this research possible.
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Great to see the first paper from this side project out in PS. I’m grateful to have had the chance to work with Franziska and Jos.
I was honored to be photographed with KDF President Lee Jae-oh, former Minister for Government Legislation and Special Affairs and a longtime democracy advocate who was once imprisoned in the facility that now houses the National Museum of Korean Democracy.
Heartfelt thanks to the Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) for an inspiring program in Seoul this September. Reuniting with Jai Kwan and Staffan—and meeting Sook Jong, Chanho, co-panelists, and fellow participants for the first time—made it especially meaningful.
The results are robust to alternative modeling assumptions and yield clear, testable empirical implications. It also opens the door to reexamining the responsiveness–stability nexus in authoritarian regimes. The paper can be accessed here:
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
A new working paper with Daiki Kishishita and Yuki Takagi! Are you torn between studies saying concessions calm vs. inflame protests? We develop a two-period model of protest cascades that identifies transparent conditions under which concessions demobilize versus backfire.
My special thanks to Danny Quah for the kind recommendation to Dr Mohan. This experience also reminds me of the importance of balancing my academic work with a stronger policy engagement. (Pretty impressive—they handed me a framed photo of myself speaking right after the panel!)
It’s a real honor to speak at such a high-profile forum alongside an exceptional lineup of speakers. I’ve already learned so much from the first day and am eager for the discussions in the coming two days.
Thank you, Haakon! This should allow me to visit Oslo again soon. I am still working on that Taipei conference I told you about and will keep you posted!
I’m thrilled to be part of this fantastic team and to push my work on authoritarian politics into new territory—especially tackling the urgent problems of AI-powered authoritarianism!
Echoing Ilaria—what a way to kick off the weekend! Our project just won a three-year grant from Norges forskningsråd the Research Council of Norway 🎉 (I was told only ~8–10% of proposals got funded. What a tough competition!).
It's really a great pleasure to co-organize the ESOC RPC 2025 with Renard this time around in Taipei. Many thanks to ESOC's board members and all the paper presenters/discussants. Looking forward to attending the annual meeting this October in DC!