I talked with @cnn.com about why the most immediate concern is Gulf air defense interceptor inventory -- not US stockpiles. Even if Iranian attack intensity slows, America's Gulf partners have already fired air defense missiles at a faster rate than they can be built.
www.cnn.com/2026/03/04/p...
a free* link for you, the people
*for seven days www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
A short- to mid-term military risk isn't the US running out of interceptors or PGMs in this conflict per se. It is the opportunity costs.
Back to doing what I do best: pointing at things on maps. (It's a wargamer thing).
I walked through Iran's retaliatory strikes, what it has left in the arsenal, and what the “big wave” of strikes Trump promised might mean with Bloomberg TV.
www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/...
Iran fired 1200+ projectiles at 5 countries in the first 48 hours. Most were drones. These saturation attacks aim to overwhelm air defenses and drain interceptors. $20-50K Shaheds vs. $4.19M air defense interceptors put US partners on the wrong side of the cost curve.
US destroyers launched Tomahawks at Iranian targets, but here’s the problem: America doesn’t have unlimited TLAMs. The Trump admin burned through big numbers in earlier strikes on Iran, Houthis, and Nigeria without replenishing stockpiles. And TLAMs would be vital in a potential China fight.
Iran’s initial response was fast: SRBMs hit US bases in the Gulf. MRBMs are needed for continued strikes on Jordan and Israel, but Tehran may not have as many. Further retaliation and scale of damage hinge on stockpile depth: what was rebuilt after the 12-Day War and what survived the first wave.
As the DoD vs. Anthropic deadline looms, its unclear which DPA authorities may be used. But DPA has emerged as a favorite tool of the Trump admin -- from taking equity stakes to compelling an AI firm, with big implications for defense tech.
My take @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
To Trump, limited air and missile strikes on Iran may look like a quick win. But without a clear objective, limited campaigns often turn into long, costly endeavors. Iran gets a vote too and its response may defy US expectations.
My thoughts @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Trump's military surge now has the real strike capacity and key enablers needed for weeks of strikes on Iran. I told @financialtimes.com the scale of this buildup signals credible strike preparation. But sustaining it without action would be incredibly costly -- and risky. www.ft.com/content/a7da...
Trump’s Middle East buildup has him backed into a corner: he needs a good ROI for the significant forces and resources tied up. This makes strikes more likely — or else this may be one of the costliest bluffs in history if he doesn't go through with it.
blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
We did the math on the US naval buildup in the Caribbean. The total: $2.9B. At its height, costs topped $20M a day. Much was already funded, but combat operations cost extra -- and opportunity costs are difficult to quantify.
My latest for @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Shifting a carrier strike group and F-35s from the Caribbean to the Middle East shows the US can surge forces, but raises the real risk of overstretch. Repeated retaskings are trading tomorrow’s readiness for today’s pressure campaigns.
blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
Iran’s missiles are its only credible deterrent against US and Israel, putting bases, shipping lanes, and energy infrastructure in range. Tehran won’t agree to cap missile stockpiles because it needs large numbers to overwhelm defenses and hit targets.
For more: blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
Great conversation on @bloomberg.com TV last night on prospects for US-Iran talks. I’m not optimistic. Why? Because both sides haven’t agreed to what they’re negotiating. That’s a recipe for unmet expectations and failed talks that make military strikes more likely. youtu.be/R4y_GdOQG1g
Iranian gunboats tried to seize a US-flagged tanker. The US then shot down a Shahed drone approaching its aircraft carrier.
I told @bloomberg.com Iran is making “a dangerous play at a time when the US has amassed significant firepower in the Middle East.”
www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
The new NDS tries to hedge by designing forces for China and everything else. But that risks ending up with two different force structures -- and that comes at a high cost. Thanks to @defenseone.bsky.social for featuring my take: www.defenseone.com/policy/2026/...
The 2026 NDS upends force planning. Homeland and Western Hemisphere first means fewer forward deployments, more reliance on surge forces. But surging depends on access from allies and a force built for China that may not fit new missions.
More on the Terminal: blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
The US military buildup in the Middle East has put a wider range of Iranian targets on the table — from missile and drone sites to even IRGC and government leadership — but all options likely fall short of collapsing the government.
www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
The US defense industrial base can’t — and shouldn’t — compete with China one-for-one. My thoughts on what it will take to rebuild the DIB [spoiler: making hard choices], what we can learn from previous periods of defense innovation, and the long road ahead.
www.bloomberg.com/news/newslet...
Strikes on Iran remain on the table, even if Trump holds off for now. A potential attack could come from US or Europe-based aircraft, or from destroyers already in the region. A CSG is not a prerequisite. My take on what strikes and possible targets could look like: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Very excited for my Bloomberg defense partner-in-crime @mgerrydoyle.bsky.social's must-read new newsletter. Who knows, there might even be a guest appearance from yours truly. Sign up!
A new $1B Pentagon investment in L3Harris goes after a critical bottleneck: solid rocket motors. They’re essential to scaling missile & drone production and replenishing munitions expended in recent operations, but the deal comes with strings attached. www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Agree with @beccawasser.bsky.social. Elaine McCusker’s shown the financial cost of ops in the past 5 months at $1.4B, but Elaine would also say you can’t buy back lost time. The opportunity cost is incredibly high.
The US can keep forces in the Caribbean — but at a high cost. These deployments burn readiness, limit presence elsewhere, and leave the US less prepared for future crises.
Back to shouting about readiness to anyone who will listen (and even those who won't): www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Private defense companies self-fund R&D, betting the Pentagon will buy what they build. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. Public defense firms play a different game, building to DoD requirements -- even with internal R&D.
My comments: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
My public service announcement on the Bloomberg Terminal (and I really hope to be right!) 👇🏻
“It is impossible for Japan to stockpile enough raw material to service all sectors — let alone the defense sector itself.” My take on the limited options for Japan’s defense industry to minimize the impact of China’s export controls. www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
I talked to the WSJ about the potential pitfalls of the Pentagon’s drone buying programs. One of the biggest risks: the drones will be OBE by the time they arrive. Keeping costs low, using software and commercial components to incrementally upgrade drones will be key.
www.wsj.com/politics/nat...
