Philosophers' Imprint

The landing page has been restored. You can once again go to philosophersimprint.org to see our journal.

We are having some technical issues with the philosophersimprint.org redirect page. The main journal site at journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/ is still working, but the redirect needs work. We are working on a fix.

I argue that morally justified harms collaterally inflicted on civilians in war can yield compensatory duties – and that a failure to compensate post bellum renders in bello attacks retroactively unjust. Such attacks are unjust on the grounds that they violate the constraint of necessity, in the following way: the option of attacking-and-compensating is less harmful relative to the option of attacking-and-not-compensating (and typically no less effective at achieving the war’s aims). In making this point, I argue that we should evaluate the candidate courses of actions diachronically – that is, in a way that mereologically conjoins the ex ante attacks with ex post compensation. I then argue that a foreseeable risk of failing to compensate post bellum can affect the evidence-relative moral liability of those engaged in the in bello attacks. The upshot is that the moral significance of compensation for rights-infringements in war is not limited to jus post bellum, but also has profound effects on jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The US and select allies are in a position, even now, to affect the moral status of some of the military operations undertaken in the Middle East over the past two decades, by deciding whether to compensate those civilians whose rights were infringed. Neglecting to do so retroactively transforms tragic but potentially justified rights-infringements into gratuitously unjustified rights-violations. I end the article by addressing several practical quandaries that such a view seems to raise.

New article:

Saba Bazargan-Forward, "Compensation and Necessity in War", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 3. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Rasa, or aesthetic emotion, is a central concern of South Asian philosophy. Bhoja, writing in the eleventh century, crafted a unique and intriguing theory of rasa as fundamentally the artistic expression of love. Love, for Bhoja, is a capacity for sensitive attention that grounds self-making and self-awareness. The reason we have to engage with works of art is that they equip us to be who we are.

New article:

Dominic McIver Lopes, "Rasa, Self, and Love in Bhoja", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 1. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

According to a long philosophical tradition and a potent kernel of common sense, loving partnerships are governed by affection and care, and so not properly evaluated by standards of justice or fairness. In this paper I precisify and challenge this idea. I argue that love and fairness are unified in the sense that some partners are only able to perform particular act-types (loving and expressing love) if their actions are sensitive to considerations of fairness. When loving acts are aimed at “sharing a life”, we properly evaluate more-basic acts of sharing–where this concerns their adherence to standards of fairness–as a way of evaluating them as complex acts of loving. Life-sharing offers an attractive feminist ideal of love, immune to concerns about the alleged imposition of fairness-related considerations where they don’t belong.

New article:

Anna-Bella Sicilia, "Love, Fairness, and Sharing a Life", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 2. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Humans have a strong tendency to hedonically adapt to their circumstances, so that something that once brought joy eventually brings only indifference. Does this tendency guarantee a kind of failure on our part? Happiness, like other emotions, seems subject to evaluation in terms of its fittingness. But it’s not clear how hedonic adaptation could possibly maintain fittingness: it involves changing one’s level of happiness in a way that doesn’t track the absolute goodness of one’s circumstances. This paper mounts a defence of hedonic adaptation against this concern. It does so by articulating a key difference between the scale of happiness and the scale of goodness, and shows how that difference guarantees an inability to track absolute levels of goodness with our levels of happiness. Given this background constraint, hedonic adaptation may be the most appropriate way for our happiness to change over time.

New article:

Alex Gregory, "Take In Your Hen: Fittingness and Hedonic Adaptation", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 4. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

This essay identifies a normative function of the concept of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that the concept of intentional action functions to focus our evaluative concern on some doings rather than others. It acts as a proxy for evaluative priority. Two arguments are offered for this thesis. First, we need a concept that functions to focus evaluative concern, and the concept of intentional action exhibits features we'd expect from a concept with this prioritizing function. Second, the thesis is explanatorily powerful: it explains in a unified manner a number of puzzling features of intentional action, including the Knobe effect, the threshold of sufficient control governing intentional action, disagreement over whether knowledge is required for intentional action, cultural variation in ascription of intentionality, and the radical pluralism of ways that intentional action manifests. This second argument also shows what can be gained by attending to the functions of our concepts of agency.

New article:

Mikayla Kelley, "The Normative Function of Intentional Action", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 5. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Employers exercise directive authority over their employees; they can issue binding orders and enforce those orders by way of various administrative sanctions. It is generally agreed that this authority is legitimate only when the employee has consented to employment but it turns out that vindicating this idea requires a careful analysis both of the kind of authority employers claim over their employees and of the kind of agreement involved in a contract of employment. It also requires getting clear on the distinctive rationale that informs the employer-employee relationship. Once this has all been done, we can explain why some of us decline any employment because we wish to 'remain our own boss' whilst many others are happy to be employed provided this is something to which we have agreed.

New article:

David Owens, "Authority and Agreement: The Case of Employment", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 6. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

When writing about the metaphysics of social institutions, philosophers rightly emphasize that institutions’ existence and nature are “up to us” in a deep and important way. Objects such as insects and stars could exist with the same basic nature in the absence of human activity; governments and religious institutions could not. But my project is to explore what happens if we begin with ways in which institutions are sometimes relatively less “up to us.” This approach points toward a behavioral theory of institutions: institutions are made up of behavior that clusters into copied roles, and the individuals who engage in that behavior, where all of the roles together promote some particular result(s). I develop and apply the theory in detail, and then show how it differs from other views in the literature by eschewing mental states and precluding metaphysical inconsistency.

New article:

Megan Henricks Stotts, "A Behavioral Theory of Social Institutions", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 7. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

We argue for two claims in this paper. First, we argue that existing taxonomies of ideal and non-ideal theory must be expanded. While non-ideal theory is often thought to be transitional in nature - that is, theorizing how agents in structurally unjust circumstances should act so as to bring about a more just state of affairs - we show that some non-ideal theory is in fact static. Static non-ideal theory attempts to guide the actions of individuals while taking background structural injustice as a kind of fixed point, or as a "backdrop" against which individuals can try to ethically interact. Second, we argue that notwithstanding the intentions of theorists, static non-ideal theory often serves ideological purposes by functioning to reinforce the (unjust) status quo. Throughout, we use theoretical debates about exploitation as illustrative of the phenomenon under discussion.

New article:

Danielle M. Wenner and Derrick F. Gray, "Structural Injustice, Exploitation, and Static Non-Ideal Theory", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 8. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

What, ontologically speaking, are best system laws? Should the laws of the best system account be identified with sentences, or propositions, or perhaps something else? These questions differ from more familiar questions about which criteria we should use to pick out the best system laws: regardless of whether laws are picked out using simplicity, informativeness, tractability, predictability, perfect naturalness, or whatever, there remains the question of what, ontologically, the best system laws are. But very little has been written on this issue; and what has been written is often ambiguous. So in this paper, we present and evaluate three ontological options for best system laws: taking them to be sentences, unstructured propositions, and structured propositions. Surprisingly, the two most cited options—sentences and unstructured propositions—face significant problems. Defenders of the best system account might want to take seriously the idea that best system laws are structured propositions.

New article:

Heather Demarest and Isaac Wilhelm, "Three Ontological Options for the Laws of the Best System", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 9. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Haecceitism is the thesis that some truths are not necessitated by the qualitative truths. In this paper I explore a general argument that purports to establish that haecceitism leads to objectionably 'cheap' violations of determinism. In response to this argument, I develop a novel position that combines considerations from metaphysics and the philosophy of language to secure the compatibility of haecceitism and determinism. This position has important parallels to the way haecceitism has been developed within counterpart theory, but, crucially, it makes no use of counterpart theory itself.

New article:

Alexander Roberts, "Speaking for Haecceitists", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 10. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Seeing-in is the experience of seeing something in a picture. This experience is present to the subject as a single, unified experience. It is not like the disjoint experience of visualizing something into a scene that one perceives. This is so despite the fact that, like the latter experience, seeing-in is twofold: it involves being visually aware of two distinct objects – an array of ink-marks, on the one hand, and the depicted scene, on the other. Plausibly, it also involves being aware of them in two distinct ways: while we see the ink-marks before us, our manner of visual awareness of the depicted object is not perceptual. In the first half of this paper, I offer an account of the subject’s sense of experiential unity in the face of twofoldness. In the paper’s second half, I demonstrate how my account of unity forces a considerable reconfiguration of the space of possible theories of seeing-in.

New article:

Rose Ryan Flinn, "The Unity of Pictorial Experience", Philosophers' Imprint 26: 11. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Some moral philosophers argue that we hold others and ourselves morally responsible for acting on second-personal reasons. This article connects this idea with the emerging literature on the moral responsibility of groups by exploring in which sense, if any, groups can be held accountable for acting on second-personal reasons. On the developed view, groups are second-personally competent if and only if they possess capacities for sympathy, acting on that sympathy, and related self-reactive attitudes. Focusing especially on loosely structured groups without unifying decision-making procedures, the article goes on to argue that the required group-level capacities can be realized through the interdependent exercise of member-level capacities.

New article:

Nicolai Knudsen, “Groups and Second-Person Competence”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 51. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Theorists are divided concerning the productivity of angry blame. Some argue that it has tremendous instrumental values or serves crucial social functions. But some argue that it is counterproductive, and we should thereby eliminate, or drastically revise, blame as a kind of moral practice. In this paper, I raise a new counterproductivity critique of angry blame. In contrast to the existing critiques, my critique does not rely on a negative characterization of blame’s content or functionality. I suggest that angry blame serves two positive social functions—a function of issuing a moral protest and a function of initiating and facilitating a moral dialogue. However, for these two functions to work optimally, they require different psychological stances in tension with each other. Angry blame is thus counterproductive, not because it is inherently bad, but because it is designed to do too much.

New article:

Shawn Tinghao Wang, “What Is Counterproductive About Angry Blame?”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 50. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Attempts to illuminate the nature of “blame” have shaped recent philosophical discussion of free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I show how, in at least one context, this search for a theory of blame has led us astray. Specifically, I focus on the contemporary debate about the “standing” to blame and argue, first, that theorizing about blame-in-general in this context has assumed an impoverished moral psychology that fails to reflect the range of blaming emotions and that conflates these emotions’ distinctive logics; and, second, that such theorizing has encouraged the propagation of misleading theories of blame’s “norms.” Rather than searching for the nature of blame, I employ and defend an alternative methodological approach that focuses on the psychology and ethics of specific reactive emotions. I then show how an agent’s own bad behavior can alter the appropriateness of these various attitudes in distinctive ways. Marking these distinctions leads to some surprising conclusions. For example, it allows us to move beyond the assumption that the wrongness of standingless blame is fundamentally a matter of hypocrisy.

New article:

Samuel Reis-Dennis, “Blame's Topography: Standing on Uneven Ground”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 49. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Those who take visual perception to be transparent face a puzzle: How does one know that she sees given that seeing is not itself an object of awareness? Most solutions to this puzzle are inferentialist in that they claim that one comes to believe that she sees on the basis of a belief that she has about the extra-mental environment. In this paper, I argue for a non-inferential alternative. I show that extant inferentialist accounts are committed to the claim that the contents of vision are inexpressible—quite literally, you can never say what you see. In light of this, I develop a non-inferential solution to the above puzzle that avoids the problem of inexpressibility. Rather than an inferential transition, I suggest that one may simply transition from the having of (but not an awareness of!) a particular visual experience to the belief that she sees thus-and-such. Properly understood, this non-inferential transition is perfectly reliable, always issuing in true belief, thereby underwriting one’s knowledge that she sees.

New article:

Jonathan Brink Morgan, “Non-Inferential Knowledge of Perception”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 48. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

A person's body is extended in space, and parts of their body occupy spatial regions. In that way, the body has a dimension of breadth in space. Yet, there is another, less appreciated dimension of the body: its depth. Roughly speaking, the depth of the body is the level of abstraction of its parts. Characteristically, and in particular for moral purposes, the depth of the body is rather high-level. Low-level objects and properties, such as individual molecules, do not really fall within the purview of the moral body--the body as it figures in various morally significant rights and interests. As I will argue, the depth of the body becomes more salient and relevant when people come to have partly digital embodiments, such as when brain-computer interfaces are integrated into their bodily processes. The dimension of depth, it turns out, is crucial for properly understanding the moral significance of brain-computer interfaces. Here, I develop a theory of depth to complement existing theories of the body and use it to improve our understanding of the purview of bodily rights and interests.

New article:

Christopher Register “The Depth of the Body”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 47. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

This article argues that the relations of social and political power that obtain between humans and pets are illegitimate. We begin by showing that pets, a largely neglected population in political philosophy, are subject to socially and politically organised power, which stands in need of justification. We then argue that pets have three moral complaints against the relations of power to which they are subject. First, our power over pets disrespects their moral independence: the fact that they are not simply available to be used to serve the interests or projects of others. Second, our power over pets systematically sets back their interests in exercising control over their own body, actions, and environment. Third, in subjecting pets to asymmetric relations of power in which they are heavily dependent on humans for the satisfaction of their interests, we subject them to objectionable risks of harm. Together, these complaints support our thesis that the power relations central to the insitution of pet keeping are illegitimate. The practical upshot is that we have a strong moral reason to abolish this institution.

New post:

Richard Healey, & Angie Pepper, “Pets, Power, and Legitimacy”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 46. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

The beginning of Plato's Philebus contains a puzzling argument: Socrates says that pleasures are different, and that this somehow supports the contention that not all pleasures are good (contrary to what he hedonist interlocutor, Protarchus, maintains). His argument has a bad reputation in the literature, and more to the point it is confusing. This paper sheds light on Socrates' argument by making use of principles from contemporary metaphysics. I argue that Socrates thinks of pleasure as exhibiting the structure that metaphysicians today associate with determinables and determinates. Specifically, he thinks that what makes each pleasure a pleasure is a unique profile, which simultaneously differentiates it from other pleasures. As a result, the kind, 'pleasure', is really a relational principle of coherence between the different kinds of pleasure. I argue that, based on this metaphysical picture, we can see why Socrates thinks that it is possible that some pleasures are bad, contrary to hedonism. Beyond making sense of the dialectic in the Philebus, my paper advances a growing literature on the interesting metaphysical views developed in this section of Plato's dialogue.

New article:

John D. Proios, “Identity and Difference in Kind: The Metaphysics of Pleasure at the Beginning of Plato’s Philebus”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 45. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

In this paper, I argue that widespread expert disagreement about sufficiently many issues central to a democratic decision-making procedure can nullify the duty to vote. I begin by drawing a distinction between different ways that we might conceive of the duty to vote, i.e. whether it is a duty to vote, no matter how one votes, or a duty to vote well. I then review some prominent arguments in favor of the existence of the duty to vote and suggest that they go through only when the potential voter in question would vote well. So the most promising existing arguments for the duty to vote, if successful, really show not merely that citizens have a duty to vote, but more strongly that they have a duty to vote well. I then discuss the epistemology of expert disagreement to show how circumstances of expert disagreement can nullify such a duty by making it impossible to vote well. To my knowledge, no one has yet brought considerations of the epistemology of expert disagreement to bear on this topic. That is my aim in the main argument of this paper. The remainder of the paper addresses alternative characterizations of 'voting well,' and argues that on other plausible characterizations, expert disagreement will still often nullify the duty to vote.

New article:

Devin Lane, “Expert Disagreement and the Duty to Vote”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 44. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Some philosophers argue that in order to accommodate a range of our practices we must suppose that causation is not an all or nothing matter: it comes in degrees. We argue for two key claims. First, we can accommodate these practices without positing degree theoretic causation, and we can do so by appealing to various things that clearly do admit of degrees. So, positing causation by degree is unnecessary. Second, not only is positing degree theoretic causation unnecessary, but in fact there is no single thing, causation by degree, that could play the role required of it if it is to accommodate these practices. Thus, we conclude, there is no motivation to posit degree theoretic causation that arises from consideration of these practices.

New article:

S. Baron, H. Beebee, D. Braddon-Mitchell, A. Eagle, & K. Miller, (2025) “How much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing?”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 43. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

How do conjunctions relate to their conjuncts? How, for example, does <Snow is white and grass is green> relate to the propositions <Snow is white> and <Grass is green>? This paper explores the unorthodox answer that conjunctions are identical to their conjuncts: throwing grammar to the wind, <Snow is white and grass is green> just 'is' the propositions <Snow is white> and <Grass is green>. I suggest two ways of motivating the view (§1), present my preferred formulation of it (§2), discuss some objections (§3), point out some connections to neighboring issues (§4), and finally, consider how it may be extended to a more comprehensive view of logical complexity (§5).

New article:

Ezra Rubenstein, “Conjunction as Identity”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 42. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

This article examines the meta-stance choice in the scientific realism debate. I propose that the epistemological aspect of this debate be reframed within an epistemological framework that views our cognitive activities as a trade-off between believing truths and minimizing errors. I identify two main alternatives to this meta-epistemological framework: firstly, the view that the realism debate involves a voluntary choice between incommensurable stances, such as an empirical and a metaphysical stance; secondly, the notion that stance selection is a result of negotiating between explanatory power and error avoidance. My proposal and the two alternatives have in common that they imply a form of epistemic voluntarism and explain the recurring stalemate in the debate. However, I argue that the presented proposal outclasses the competing perspectives due to its enhanced generality, impartiality, a more comprehensive explanation of the anti-realist sentiment, and its potential to mitigate the recurring stalemate.

New article:

Raimund Pils, “Navigating the Meta-Epistemology of the Scientific Realism Debate: In Defense of Truth”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 41. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Normative argumentation theory is a field dedicated to the normative study of argumentation in real-life contexts and to the development of norms meant to guide arguers in the attempt of arguing well. Among argumentation theorists, there exist two widespread assumptions. First, the assumption that ideally, arguers ought to explore the reasons relevant to the topic of their interpersonal arguing without constraints. And second, the assumption that the norms of argumentation should be designed to contribute to the realization of this ideal. In this paper, I question those assumptions. I show that argumentative norms meant to realize the ideal of free exploration, freedom-to-explore norms, reliably clash with morally valuable standing norms that protect privacy, autonomy and legitimate authority. When they so clash, they generate epistemic and other morally relevant harms. I argue that normative argumentation theory ought to resolve this problem by acknowledging the potential legitimacy of standing norms even during argumentation. I show how such a change would impact fallacy theory with respect to the ad hominem and poisoning the well fallacies.

New article:

Katharina Stevens, “Standing Norms in Argumentation”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 40. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

New article:

Chloé de Canson, “Bayesianism and the Inferential Solution to Hume's Problem”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 39. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

This article argues that consent must be revocable. I present two arguments for this conclusion. On the argument from informed consent, irrevocable consent lacks validity because it cannot be sufficiently informed. On the argument from bodily integrity, irrevocable consent lacks validity because we do not have the authority to deny our future selves the ability to protect our bodily integrity. I explain why the argument from bodily integrity captures unique moral problems raised by irrevocable consent and illuminates an important but undertheorized distinction between autonomy and bodily integrity.

New article:

Angela Sun, “Can Consent Be Irrevocable?”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 38. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

In addition to praising and criticizing works of art, we can and do hold artists responsible for their artistic productions. Building on a suggestion from Susan Wolf, this paper develops a Strawsonian approach to aesthetic responsibility and shows both its attractions and limitations. The proper target of aesthetic reactive attitudes in general is an agent’s quality of aesthetic judgment, and the ‘basic demand’ we make of artists as such is for aesthetic value responsiveness: we expect artists to be counterfactually sensitive to the realization of expected aesthetic value in their productions. In contrast with our moral responsibility responses, we do not expect artists to be able to give their reasons for what they have done, and we allow for fewer artistic exemptions from the basic demand. While this Strawsonian approach sheds light on the nature of creative artistic agency, it fails to capture the full range of our artistic responsibility responses, since it excludes credit and criticism for artists’ (lack of) embodied skill.

New article:

Robbie Kubala,“Aesthetic Reactive Attitudes and Artistic Responsibility”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 37. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Abstract in alt text. #philsky

Just published:

Ian Shane Peebles, (2025) “To race or not to race: A normative debate in the philosophy of race.”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 36. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...

Just published:

Andrew Y. Lee,, (2025) “Consciousness Makes Things Matter”, Philosophers' Imprint 25: 35. doi: doi.org/10.3998/phim...