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Open-source investigator specialising in Russian security issues. My newsletter unpacks major issues or storie from the world of Russian security — tracing the relationships, trends, and deeper meaning behind them. www.threatologist.com/newsletter
Detailed report here on Russian recruitment in Africa for its war on Ukraine. Kenya and Cameroon lead the way as a source of recruits, and financial incentives are a key driver. Recruitment agencies and local officials facilitate the process
lansinginstitute.org/2026/02/23/a...
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There isn’t a great deal of in-depth research into either group — just one scholarly paper. This in many ways reflects the limits of the groups themselves: they are narrative-focused but have limited operational capabilities. This makes it harder for anyone to take them seriously.
The Freedom of Russia Legion, by contrast, portrays itself as a broader church, encompassing views from the far-right to the far-left. It wants to see a democratic Russia, similar in form to the current federation but reintegrated into the international community.
Yet they are clearly divided by ideology: The Russian Volunteer Corps is an ethnonationalist conservative outfit with links to neo-Nazism. It wants to see an ethnic Russian state and views the collapse of the current Russian Federation as inevitable.
Both groups have a lot in common: They were both created in 2022; seek the downfall of Vladimir Putin; recruit Russian citizens; and are closely integrated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They have operated on the frontline and in Russia itself.
These two groups are the clearest manifestation of a relatively new phenomenon brought about by Russia’s war on Ukraine: non-trivial, non-Islamist groups using the war as a platform to advocate armed struggle within Russia itself.
Who are Russia’s non-Islamist insurgents?
Over the last week, I’ve been building out profiles of two groups — the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion — and associated individuals.
Despite all this, Kolokoltsev claims his ministry is performing well, with a 3% reduction in crime and growing public confidence in the police. His statement is, in essence, a standard call for more resources.
Large-scale recruitment for the war has exacerbated existing recruitment problems: People who are willing to serve in the security services can get a much better package elsewhere.
Kolokoltsev’s comments reflect long-standing problems at the Interior Ministry: It has always been the ugly duckling of the security services, enjoying less prestige and resources compared to organisations like the FSB.
For example, legislative amendments in late 2025 meant that employees of the Prosecutor’s Office and Investigative Committee receive veteran status for service in the territory of the “special military operation”, whereas Interior Ministry employees don’t.
Kolokoltsev attributed the recruitment problems to low salaries and difficulties in finding accommodation. He also complained about the uneven treatment employees receive compared to other members of the security services.
According to his figures, there was a 7% reduction in the workforce in the last year and this was not offset by the number of recruits. Overall, the are 212,000 vacancies, including in key departments.
In a session of the State Duma Committee on Security, Kolokoltsev said that his ministry was being stretched to its limits and struggling to replace staff.
Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev has complained about staffing shortages — echoing a long-standing complaint.
Lawyers cited by Caucasian Knot note that bans on social media reporting of drones violates constitutional free speech provisions.
To find out more on those measures, see my annual report Terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus in 2025: www.threatologist.com/terrorism-in...
The move is one of a number of measures by regional authorities to clamp down on negative online commentary under the guise of security. Chechnya issued a warning in August 2025, while North Ossetia and Dagestan subsequently issued formal decrees.
The stated rationale for the measure is national security: Drone operators use footage to refine their tactics.
Fines for repeated offences increase: up to RUB 5,000 for citizens, RUB 50,000 for officials, and RUB 500,000 for legal persons.
According to the new rules, issued by the Stavropol Kray Dumam citizens who post photos or videos of drones face fines of up to RUB 3,000 for a first offence. The fines for officials are up to RUB 30,000, and for legal persons up to RUB 100,000.
Stavropol Kray has introduced administrative fines for social media users who report on drone activity — the latest effort to use drones to censor unfavourable reporting in the region.
If you want to see the wider context for instability in Stavropol Kray, see my annual report Terrorism and counterterrorism in the North Caucasus in 2025
www.threatologist.com/terrorism-in...
In 2025, Stavropol Kray was one of the main focal points of violence, with 27 incidents in total. Most of these were initiated by the security services, although drone attacks also contributed to the total.
The operation is the second violent incident in Stavropol Kray this year: On 20 January, the security services killed another man similarly accused of planning a terrorist attack and resisting arrest.
According to the official account, the man was killed resisting arrest. There is no independent confirmation of the claims.
The authorities claim that the man was collecting IED components, having been recruited by Ukraine through Telegram. His alleged target was a building belonging to a local branch of the state Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation.
The FSB have shot a man accused of planning a terrorist attack in Stavropol on the Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland.
Akhmat is perfectly placed to replace Adam as heir apparent, should that prove necessary. As such, recent developments have changed less about the succession process than the volume of coverage given to Adam's accident suggests.