(saw this in RSS) I've had various Ollama models write CLAUDE[.]md and skills, and also had minimax m2.1 (which is just amaze) do it and they're all pretty good at it.
@hrbrmstr.dev
a.k.a. boB Rudis β’ πΊπ¦ Pampa β’ Don't look at meβ¦I do what he doesβjust slower. #rstats #js #duckdb #goavuncularβ’π¨βπ³β’βοΈβ’ π€β’ Varaforseti Γ GΓΆgn VΓsindi @ GreyNoise β’ 47-watch.com β’ https://stormwatch.ing β’ https://dailydrop.hrbrmstr.dev β’ Maineπ¦
(saw this in RSS) I've had various Ollama models write CLAUDE[.]md and skills, and also had minimax m2.1 (which is just amaze) do it and they're all pretty good at it.
The infrastructure ties back to established CVE exploitation operations.
h/t to Defused for their report as well: xcancel.com/DefusedC...
www.greynoise.io/blo...
2/2
New research: Threat actors are actively mapping LLM infrastructure.
Our Ollama honeypots captured 91K+ attack sessions. One campaign systematically probed 73+ model endpointsβGPT-4o, Claude, Llama, Gemini, and moreβacross 80K sessions in 11 days.
www.greynoise.io/blo...
1/2
If your systems were hit during this window, the vulnerability data may already be for sale.
Links to IoCs are in the post.
4/4
* The IAB Model: This wasn't a direct hit; it was a "restocking" of the Initial Access Broker market.
* Infrastructure: The activity originated from a suspicious hosting provider (CTG Server Limited) with a history of phishing and abuse.
3/4
A single operator systematically scanned the internet, testing 240+ different exploits to build a fresh inventory for 2026 ransomware attacks.
Key Takeaways:
* Timing is everything: Attackers used the holiday skeleton crew window to scan unimpeded for 4 days.
2/4
That which was originally a private customer threat intel share in our weekly At The Edge reports is now a public blog post!
www.greynoise.io/blo...
This is a deep dive into a massive reconnaissance campaign that unfolded between December 25β28.
1/4
#macOS folks!!
Today is a *great* day to:
```bash
brew update && brew upgrade && brew cleanup && brew doctor
```
then:
```bash
brew bundle dump --file=~/Brewfile --describe --force
```
to create a `Brewfile` you can use to "quickly" restore the Homebrew bits that you rely on.
I ran it when I got to #2.1/#2.2's house and hopefully the networks you visit will be equally as clean.
Lifehacker does a bang-up job explaining it, too.
NPR has some more background on this new type of consumer exposure, too.
www.npr.org/2025/11/...
2/2
GreyNoise Check all green!
ππ½ Lifehacker for introducing GreyNoise Check to a broader population!
π lifehacker.com/tech/...
If you haven't used GreyNoise Check β check.labs.greynoise.io β this is the perfect time to do so, especially if you're visiting friends/fam over the holidays.
1/2
I also took the opportunity to make fun of some very incompetent attackers.
Hey, if they can attack, so can I!
www.greynoise.io/blo...
3/3
We've captured over 50K (some, barely) "unique" #React2Shell payloads, and a few caught our eye as potentially being some of the more nascent "AI"-created or enhanced ones.
We took the opportunity to dig into five of them and see what makes them tick.
2/3
"There's Payloads, And Then There's pAIloads: A Look At Selected Opportunistic (And Possibly AI-"Enhanced") React2Shell Probes and Attacks"
www.greynoise.io/blo...
1/3
Just in: Watch #React2Shell exploitation unfold over time in the map below (geo of source IPs attempting to exploit CVE-2025-55182).
#GreyNoise #ThreatIntel #CVE202555182 #Nextjs #Cybersecurity
Whilst spelunking through React2Shell traffic and associated initial access payloads, I came across a late-to-the party attacker attempting to deploy a MeshCentral agent for C2. Thanks to Censys, we poked a bit harder, and boy howdy are we on the precipice of a real mes[hs].
This is textbook opportunistic exploitationβnot novel, but serious. These campaigns lead to credential theft, cryptomining, ransomware staging, & access brokering.
Patch if you haven't. DO NOT RELY ON WAFs ALONE.
Block IPs using GN feeds & monitor for IoCs in the post.
3/3
What we're seeing:
Automation-heavy traffic (Go clients, scanner UAs)
PoE validation via PowerShell math commands
Encoded stagers downloading secondary payloads
AMSI bypass attempts via reflection
~50% of IPs first seen in December 2025
Early migration into Mirai botnets
2/3
I had the [mis?]fortune of being awake just as attackers decided to slam the public internet with React2Shell exploits. GreyNoise had a tag up for it yesterday afternoon.
Full write-up of the initial spate of attacks:
www.greynoise.io/blo...
1/3
Got 30s of public media "fame" on NPR yesterday www.npr.org/2025/11/28/n...
Perfect for holiday tech support seasonβcheck your relatives' networks in 30 seconds instead of doing the awkward "let me look at your computer" thing.
For devs: `curl -s check.labs.greynoise...` returns JSON. No auth, no limits.
Full story: www.greynoise.io/blo...
3/3
Our Labs team built a free tool to check: visit check.labs.greynoise.io and see instantly if your IP has been caught scanning the internet.
No signup. No email harvesting. Just answers from our global sensor network that sees billions of IPs.
2/3
π New tool alert: GreyNoise IP Check
Your home network might be compromised and you'd never know. Residential proxies, IoT botnets, and router malware are everywhereβturning regular internet connections into attack infrastructure.
1/3
ΒΉ I apologize for anyone who ended up with tea on their keyboards after reading that word when associated with the EU.
5/5
While others look through "legal documents" we got receipts right from the network packets. You can read the whole thing @ "When Bulletproof Hosting Proves Bulletproof: The Stark Industries Shell Game"
π www.greynoise.io/blo...
4/5
As a result, Stark did a series of stunningly adroit "business", organizational, & network infrastructure moves that not only let them completely avoid punishment, but also come back even stronger and more dangerous than they were before.
3/5
Back in May, the EU decided to wield its mightyΒΉ fist & drop some sanctions on Stark. Exceptβ¦they (the EU) suck @ OPSEC & the impending sanctions leaked.
2/5
Line graph showing IP activity from two bulletproof hosting providers from July to November. Orange line represents PQ Hosting (AS44477) peaking at 1,600 IPs in early September before declining to near zero by November. Blue line shows THE.Hosting/WorkTitans (AS209847) remaining low until late September, then spiking to over 1,000 IPs in November as PQ Hosting activity ceased, illustrating the migration of malicious operations between hosting providers.
There once was an organization called Stark Industries (no, not *that* one! this one is real!).
They emerged around the time Russia decided to invade Ukraine. Oddly enough, their ASN real estate was the source of scads of Russian state-sponsored cyber ops.
1/5
Good morning.
This is your reminder to get to the gym so that you can beat up racists if you have to.
The protocol is cool.
Relying on Bluesky for storage, authentication, etc. is stupid.
Really, really, really, really stupid,.