argue that Turing's question is considerably less interesting if it doesn't illuminate the original question. When is AI genuinely agentive?
But I like the question you are asking and agree this is philosophically rich.
I see. I tend to think epistemology is misdirected. What matters is the normative evaluation of our actions, including our doxastic actions. Epistemic evaluation of things like belief states is less interesting. Since performing actions requires agency which requires mindedness, I would still 1/2
I see. But if he (or we) doesn’t take his “new question” to illuminate to some extent the original, then the whole idea loses a great deal of interest.
“Concept” not “context”
I read this point in the context of Wittgenstein’s PLA. The context of “intelligence” has application as part of a public language game. So, our inability to tell the difference entails that the machine satisfies the application conditions for the word/concept.
essentially, yes.
It would be a strange twist if the second amendment saved democracy this way.
Well played
We at the Review mourn the loss of Tom Stoppard (1937–2025). In celebration of his life and work, we’ve unlocked his Art of Theater interview from the archive. buff.ly/0waMbzK
Some desires, thankfully, go unsatisfied
Philosophy
FFS. Can we please stop writing as if treating a member of the clergy is worse than the same treatment of any other person?
Having tenure in TX is no great barrier to dismissal
I'm reasonably confident that nobody will agree with much in this book -- on either side of intuitions debate! Thanks for the post!
Very pleased that my Cambridge Element, The Indispensability of Intuitions, is now available. Free to download for the next two weeks. Check it out!
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
#philosophy #epistemology #philosophyofmind
“If we aren't free to pursue research and teaching based on wherever the knowledge leads us, we are not truly working in the service of the public.”
— Rana Jaleel, associate professor at UC Davis & Chair of the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom & Tenure
I agree that logical or metaphysical necessity is not sufficient for a property to be essential. This seems to me to be a conceptual matter settled by intuition. I do see the worry here, about my stipulation -- but will have to think about it when I have more time
I think it is true in the way Kripke suggests: Nec(if x exists, then x is true)
I do think they serve as truth-makers; they are in the "extensions" of propositions. So, the view ends up being similar to the one defended by Baylis (1948).
Well, I am partial to the idea that states-of-affairs are abstract when they don't obtain and concrete when they do (when they are facts). Similar to Linsky-Zalta on the contingently, non-concrete.
Here I intended it to be stipulated that truths are essentially true. (In the case of facts, I think this comes from our ordinary concept and is not stipulated.)
and they have the property of obtaining essentially. The identity theorist, IMO, would do better to identify facts with truths, rather than true propositions. I still think this is a category mistake, but not so egregious. (What is the truth value of the fact that p?)
In this case, the correct relation is closer to something like composition -- truths have propositions in their analyses.
I read facts this way. It just sounds wrong to say "The fact that Hilary Clinton won in 2016 exists, but isn't a fact". I take facts to be states-of-affairs that obtain, (more)
It is not identity. Truths don't exist in worlds where the proposition is false, but the proposition does exist in those worlds. Since being true is an essential property of truths, it would be wrong to say that they exist in that world but just aren't true (more)
Let me introduce the slightly awkward notion of a truth as in, "It's a truth that JC was pres in 1979". Truths, I will suppose, have the property of being true necessarily. What is the relation between the proposition that p and the truth that p? (more)
This is just a little more explicitly the argument I was suggesting.
the fact that Carter was president in 1979 would not have existed had Carter not been president in 1979, but the true proposition that Carter was president in 1979 would have existed had Carter not been president then; it merely would not have been true.
By the way, just came across this in T. Parson's paper: Frege's thoughts are the referents of that-clauses in non-factive contexts, and so they are my propositions. Are the true ones facts? I think not. One reason is familiar from metaphysical considerations: as philosophers construe facts, (more)
Well, that is far better put than I could have managed!
is a contingent feature. So, the proposition exists when false. If facts = true propositions, then the truth wouldn't be a contingent feature. So, whatever a fact is, it isn't just a true proposition. (I'm sick, so maybe I'm not spelling this out carefully or just missing something.)
